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Abstract
In normative economics and behavioural social sciences, rationality is described as
a set of rationality axioms on preferences. A common explanatory strategy is to
attribute deviations from standard decision theory axioms to `reasoning errors' using
the dual-system model. The main idea is that reasoning errors are often sourced in
the fast and automatic System 1 and that the logical System 2 has the capacity to
correct these errors. Very little eﬀort has been made to explain what this logical
reasoning is, what are its `limitations', and how it leads to preferences that satisfy
these axioms.
My thesis explores the relevance of John Broome's (2013) philosophical argument
for normative and behavioural economics that the notion of `reasoning' is separate
from that of `rationality'. I propose a simple `Broomean' model of reasoning as a
conscious, explicit, and rule-guided mental process  what cognitive scientists and
behavioural economists call System 2  and investigate the extent to which rational
preferences can or cannot be reached by this type of reasoning.
Chapters 1 and 2 develop the formal framework that allows us to capture and
disentangle the notions of reasoning and rationality. Chapter 2 concludes that reas-
oning is successful in achieving some but not all requirements of the theory. One
implication of this is that automatic processes jump in where reasoning fails to lead
to rational preferences. Chapter 3 uses this framework to discuss general problems
and famous paradoxes to expected utility theory in decision theory and behavioural
economics.
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Introduction
Can rational choice be reached by reasoning? This thesis is about answering this
question. It is a question I wanted to ask after reading John Broome's answer
(Broome, 2007) to Kolodny's article (Kolodny, 2005) on the nature of `rationality
requirements'. Then I read Broome's book, Rationality through reasoning (2013),
in which he argues that, theories of rationality such as rational choice theory can be
described by requirements of rationality (e.g. transitivity of preferences), and often
neglect to explain the `reasoning' by which one comes to satisfy these requirements.
In his words,
[they] seem to think they have ﬁnished their job when they have de-
scribed the requirements of rationality. [. . . ] I think these authors must
believe that, once you know what requirements there are, that knowledge
directly supplies you with premises you can use in active reasoning. They
must believe that, starting from knowledge of a particular requirement,
you can reason your way actively to satisfying that requirement (2013,
pp. 208-9)
So according to Broome, knowledge of the requirements does not provide the self-
help tools necessary to become rational if one is not already. This argument rests on
a careful distinction between `requirements of rationality' and `rules of reasoning'.
Broome's informal analysis of rationality and reasoning is very well received among
philosophers but is almost unknown to economists. So the ﬁrst two chapters set
up the modelling framework which can represent (i) an agent's `mental states', (ii)
rationality requirements on an agent's set of mental states, and (iii) rules of reasoning
by which an agent can create new mental states, given existing ones.
The ﬁrst chapter describes conventional rational choice as a theory of rationality
requirements on mental states while the second chapter formalises reasoning and
addresses the main question of this thesis: whether and in what ways one can come
to satisfy rational choice requirements by reasoning. Then it relates the formal ana-
lysis to existing literature, particularly `System 1/ System 2' models in psychology
and behavioural economics. The third chapter uses this framework to reconstruct
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how Savage (1954, pp. 101-3) resolved his personal problem of discovering that
his preferences over Allais's gambles violated the sure-thing principle which is an
implication of his own axioms of expected utility theory.
Following are detailed descriptions of each chapter.
0.1 Chapter 1
The framework starts with the fundamental notion of mental states as attitudes
such as beliefs or intentions towards particular propositions, and from it builds a
notion of rationality as requirements on an agent's set of mental states. Diﬀerent
theories of rationality recognise some speciﬁcations of attitudes and propositions.
I represent Broome's theory of rationality and conventional rational choice as two
theories of requirements, the ﬁrst from philosophy and the second from economics.
Following Broome, with mental states I represent the agent's internal language
relevant to practical reasoning. A person will at least have the attitude of belief and
of intention towards propositions when engaging with practical reasoning, such as
the belief that it is sunny or the intention that I go sailing.
For choice theory, I consider a non-empty set X of mutually exclusive choice
options such as goods or political candidates, and the attitudes of preference and
indiﬀerence towards them. In each choice context, certain options from X are feas-
ible. Conventional choice theory implicitly assumes the feasible set to be known. I
enrich the theory in our framework with beliefs about what the feasibility set is and
intentions prior to any choice. Following Broome, choices are not mental states, but
are rather caused by intentions.
Eight requirements make together my `Broomean' theory of rational choice. Of
them all, Economic Enkrasia is the most `Broomean' one; the choice-theoretic coun-
terpart of Broome's ordinary Enkrasia. It diﬀers from ordinary Enkrasia in that
intentions respond to preferences and feasibility beliefs rather than ought-beliefs.
I classify rationality requirements in a taxonomy of requirements typically found
in choice theoretic axiomatisations. The taxonomy consists of four types of require-
ment: i) Completeness requirements (e.g. completeness of preferences), ii) Consist-
ency requirements (e.g. non-contradiction of preferences), iii) Closedness require-
ments (e.g. transitivity), and iv) Negative Closedness requirements (e.g. negative
transitivity).
I show that, except for a particular case that, if a requirement is of one type
then it is not of any other type, and that every possible single requirement with two
or three mental states is a conjunction of requirements from the taxonomy. Then
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I deﬁne a single type of requirement (all types of requirement considered above are
special cases of this type) and prove that every possible single requirement is a
conjunction of generalised requirements of this type with a ﬁnite number of mental
states. This classiﬁcation will help us in the next chapter to answer Broome's main
question which is at the core of this Thesis; whether reasoning helps to achieve any
type of requirement.
0.2 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 unpacks Broome's account of reasoning in a simple model of reason-
ing for rational choice.1 This account explores the relations of consequence that
hold between attitudes (e.g. beliefs, intentions), and not between propositions or
sentences as usual (2013, p. 254); an idea that captures the intuitive notion of
everyday human reasoning as a mental activity conducted in a language through
which you give rise to new attitudes from existing ones following `reasoning rules'.
These reasoning rules are restrictive in two ways. First, they create rather than
remove attitudes; for instance, no rule removes the preference for x to y given the
preference for y to x. Second, new attitudes follow from the presences of attitudes
rather than the absences of attitudes; for instance, no rule forms a preference based
on the absence of other preferences.
Drawing on the classiﬁcation of the formal structure of requirements developed
in Chapter 1, I show that, rule-following reasoning (i) is always capable of achiev-
ing Closedness requirements, (ii) cannot achieve Consistency requirements, (iii) can
achieve Completeness or Negative Closedness requirements, but usually only at the
cost of creating inconsistencies; and so give a partially negative answer to the main
question of the thesis. I study some basic requirements of rational choice; com-
pleteness and transitivity of weak preferences and Economic Enkrasia, and show
how far one can go when reasoning to satisfy them. And with it, how far our neg-
ative answer reveals gaps in Broome's theory, or deﬁciencies in choice theory and
behavioural economics.
I relate the implications of the results derived from this model to existing lit-
erature, particularly `System 1/ System 2' models in psychology and behavioural
economics. The central idea is that judgment and choice is an interplay between
the automatic, non-verbal, and associative System 1 and the conscious, explicit,
and rule-guided System 2. System 1 generates impressions, intuitions, feelings,
1The thesis reports my own work. In the course of my PhD I had the opportunity to discuss
extensively my research with my supervisors. Our paper Dietrich et al. (2019) has been the product
of these discussions.
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and impulses, and System 2, operating on the outputs of System 1, forms explicit
beliefs, intentions and preferences (Wason and Evans, 1974 and Kahneman, 2011).
A growing number of behavioural economic models have incorporated the dual-
system hypothesis to model choice. I identify three prominent approaches. In the
ﬁrst approach, choice is the result of two types of conﬂicting selves, the System 1
`irrational' self and the System 2 `rational' self that solve a maximisation problem
against each other. In the second approach, the two selves are allies that work
together to solve the maximisation problem. The third approach is to understand
them as complementary systems contributing towards the mental process. I argue
that this model of reasoning can be understood as an explicit description of Sys-
tem 2 reasoning and that the negative results make a case against the ﬁrst two
approaches. The two systems complement each other in the sense that they are able
to process diﬀerent types of information. System 2 processes mental states which
are attitudes towards propositions while System 1 processes mental states which are
non-propositional. Using the model, some examples of System 1 and 2 mental states
and their interaction are presented.
0.3 Chapter 3
A negative conclusion of Chapter 2 is that explicit reasoning cannot achieve con-
sistency requirements. In plain English, this result says that, in reasoning explicitly
you cannot conclude in the absence of an attitude, a thesis that Broome agrees with
(2013, p. 278). Broome's own interpretation is that when explicit reasoning fails
`automatic processes will normally prevent you from having contradictory beliefs' to
achieve consistency (2013, p. 278). But there is not much discussion what to make
of this. Chapter 3 gives a possible explanation. Using the formal analysis in the ﬁrst
two chapters, I reconstruct how Savage resolved his personal problem of discovering
that his preferences over Allais's gambles violated the Sure-thing principle which is
a basic requirement in Savage's framework.
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Chapter 1
Rational choice as a theory of
rationality requirements
1.1 Introduction
According to John Broome (2013), theories of rationality such as rational choice can
be described by `requirements of rationality', e.g. transitivity of strict preferences.
Requirements of this sort require something on a person's set of mental states: her
beliefs, her preferences, and so on to be properly related to each other. Theories
of rationality that are solely described by requirements of rationality neglect to
explain the `reasoning part' by which one can come to satisfy these requirements
(2013, pp. 208-9). A person acquires or drops a particular mental state through
active reasoning, which is a rule-following conscious mental act that applies directly
on the contents of a person's mental states (2013, p. 153). This argument rests on
a careful distinction between `requirements of rationality' and `reasoning'. Others,
particularly (Kolodny, 2005, 2007), have questioned whether this is the right way to
think about requirements and reasoning.
Many rationality requirements are or can be expressed as an `If . . . then . . . '
statement whose consequent is a proposition about a single mental state and the
antecedent is a proposition about a set of mental states, while rules of reasoning
describe, in a quite similar form, a way in which a conclusion follows from a set of
premises. For example, transitivity of strict preferences states that, for all options
x, y, z, if x is strictly preferred to y and y is strictly preferred to z, then x is strictly
preferred to z. Analogously, the reasoning towards my conclusion, `I prefer x to
z', follows from my premises, `I prefer x to y and I prefer y to z'. Because of the
structural analogy between requirements expressed as conditional statements and
reasoning rules, philosophers and economists often think that requirements apply
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on processes. For example, Kolodny has defended the view that requirements require
you to do something, that requirements apply on processes (Kolodny, 2005, 2007)1.
And Savage has famously paralleled his axioms of expected utility theory with the
principles of logic, suggesting that they can be used as reasoning templates: Pursu-
ing the analogy with logic, [he says] the main use I would make of P1 [completeness
and transitivity] and its successors is normative, to police my own decisions for con-
sistency and, where possible, to make complicated decisions depend on simpler ones
(Savage, 1954, p. 20). There is room for debate about whether rationality require-
ments `really' apply on processes or not, and hence about whether Broome's rigid
separation of requirements and reasoning reﬂects the best way of thinking about
how a person can come to satisfy rationality requirements. But there is no doubt
that many theorists describe rational choice as a set of axioms on preferences. To
this end, this chapter analyses the formal structure of requirements  and indeed of
any rationality requirement  setting aside reasoning.
I identify four requirement types that have an `If . . . then . . . ' structure typ-
ically found in choice theoretic axiomatisations: i) completeness requirements (e.g.
completeness of preferences), ii) consistency requirements (e.g. non-contradiction of
preferences), iii) closedness requirements (e.g. transitivity), and iv) negative closed-
ness requirements (e.g. negative transitivity). I show that, except for a particular
case, no requirement is of two types. I then deﬁne a single type of requirement (all
types of requirement considered above are special cases of this type) and prove that
every possible single requirement is a conjunction of generalised requirements of this
type. The proposed taxonomy of requirements is essential for answering in Chapter
2 whether reasoning can bring an agent to satisfy each of the theory's requirements;
the main question of this thesis.
The second part of the chapter is less formal. It provides examples of the use
of the taxonomy in theories of rationality. Particularly, I use rational choice as
a main example of a theory of rationality requirements. This version of rational
choice is inspired by Broome's philosophical analysis of mental states as types of
attitudes such as beliefs or intentions towards particular propositions. I use mental
states to represent the agent's internal language relevant to practical reasoning. A
person will at least have the attitude of belief and of intention towards propositions
1According to Broome, rationality requirements have wide scope: for example, an enkrasia
requirement takes the form `Rationality requires of you that if you believe you ought to do F
then you intend to do F'. According to Kolodny, rationality requirements have narrow scope: for
example, an enkrasia requirement takes the form `If you believe you ought to do F, rationality
requires of you that you intend to do F'. Naturally, Broome is primarily concerned with synchronic
requirements: requirements on attitudes held simultaneously, while Kolodny is primarily concerned
with process requirements: requirements that require you to do something over time.
6
when engaging with practical reasoning, such as the belief that it is sunny or the
intention that I go sailing. For rational choice theory, I consider a non-empty set X
of mutually exclusive choice options, goods or political candidates and so on, and
the attitudes of preference and indiﬀerence towards them. In each choice context,
certain options from X are feasible. I enrich the theory with beliefs about what the
feasible set is and intentions prior to any choice as choices are not mental states but
are rather caused by intentions. Conventional choice theory implicitly assumes the
feasible set to be known and describes choices as choice functions that assign the
objects chosen from the feasible set. So this new framework partly recasts a simple
version of rational choice in terms of an agent's set of mental states; her preferences,
feasibility beliefs, and intentions. The reason for doing so is to explicitly include
more of the agent's mental states (her beliefs, intentions, preferences, ...) that are
implicitly involved when considering requirements of rational choice.
The chapter proceeds in the usual order: Section 2 gives the abstract deﬁnitions
of the framework. Section 3 presents the taxonomy of requirements. Section 4
provides examples of the use of the taxonomy in theories of rationality. Section 5
concludes. Proofs omitted from the main text are in an appendix.
1.2 Formal concepts and deﬁnitions
In this framework an agent operates in a theory of rationality in which:
1. the agent has mental states which are attitudes towards particular proposi-
tions.
2. the agent can create new mental states by following rules of reasoning.
3. there are combinations of mental states which are allowed by requirements of
rationality.
Formally, the quadruple (L,A, T ,S) denotes the agent's environment where L con-
tains the possible objects of attitudes, A the possible attitude types such as a belief,
an intention, a preference, S captures how the agent can create mental states from
existing ones, and T captures which combinations of mental states are rationally
allowed, i.e. the theory's requirement. T captures an external notion of rationality,
i.e. that of being rational which depends on the requirements of a theory of ration-
ality, whereas S captures an internal notion of rationality, i.e. that of becoming
rational that depends on the agent's perception. So tuple (L,A, T ,S) captures a
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view of rationality according which rationality is i) non universal: diﬀerent theor-
ies of rationality recognise some combinations of attitudes and propositions, and ii)
independent of the agent's perception.
1.2.1 Mental states
A mental state is the fundamental notion in this model. I build this notion consid-
ering a non-empty set L of propositions and a non-empty ﬁnite set A of attitude
types. Any attitude type a ∈ A comes with a number of places na in N+ = {1, 2, ...},
and a domain of propositions Da ⊆ L. I call an attitude type towards particular
proposition or propositions a propositional attitude, more simply, an attitude or a
mental state.
Deﬁnition 1.1. A mental state is any tuple (p1, p2, ..., pk, a) that satisﬁes the
following properties:
1. a is an attitude type in A and
2. p1, p2, ..., pk are propositions in Da, where k = na.
Any such tuple (p1, p2, ..., pk, a) is an attitude type a towards p1, p2, ..., pk. The
number of places and the domain tell us that the attitude type applies to combina-
tions p1, p2, ..., pk of k propositions that belong to Da. For example, (I bike, I walk,
preference) is a mental state that consists of a preference attitude that applies to
pairs of propositions that belong to the relevant domain Da of preference.
A remark about notation: Typically, I will use labels such as m,m1,m′, ... to
denote mental states; and labels such as M,M1,M ′, ... to denote any set of mental
states that are logically possible. I will writeM = {(p1, p2, ..., pk, a) : a ∈ A, k = na,
and p1, p2, ..., pk ∈ Da} throughout to denote the set of all logically possible mental
states.
Moreover, I will use the term mental constitution or constitution to refer to
a particular subset ofM that describes the agent's psychology as a combination of
her mental states held at a single time. Formally:
Deﬁnition 1.2. A constitution is a set of mental states C ⊆M.
An example is the constitution C = {(p, p′, a) , (p′, p′′, a)}. Throughout, I will
write C = 2M to denote the set of all constitutions. Constitutions in C will typically
be denoted by labels such as C0, C1, C ′, .... I will say that the pair (L,A) denotes
your mental structure.
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1.2.2 Requirements
Given a mental structure (L,A), I can deﬁne the notion of a requirement. Re-
quirements allow some constitutions from (L,A). Formally:
Deﬁnition 1.3. A requirement is a set of constitutions R ⊆ C. A constitution C
is said to:
1. EITHER satisfy R if C ∈ R.
2. OR violate R if C /∈ R.
It is useful to say that, an implication of the deﬁnition of a requirement as a set R
of allowed constitutions is that a requirement rules out some set of constitutions, i.e.
the complement of the allowed constitutions R′ =M\C . I now give an example of
a requirement, more precisely of a requirement schema, or more simply of a schema.
Transitivity of strict preferences: For any x, y, z ∈ X,
if (x, y,) ∈ C and (y, z,) ∈ C, then (x, z,) ∈ C.
Requirements are requirement schemas since they involve parameters. In the ex-
ample,  is a two-place attitude in A interpreted as a strict preference and propos-
itions x, y ,z ∈ L are the parameters of the requirement. A constitution C satisﬁes
transitivity if C satisﬁes all instances of the requirement schema above.
Remark 1.1. By inspection of Deﬁnition 1.3, one observes that:
1. if R = C, then the requirement is satisﬁed by all constitutions and is the
tautological requirement.
2. if R = ∅, then the requirement is satisﬁed by no constitution and is the
contradictory requirement.
1.3 A taxonomy of requirements
Let a type of requirement be a set R = {R1, R2, ...} of all the requirements that
belong to the same type and a taxonomy of requirements be a set T of types of
requirement R. Since I am interested in analysing the formal structure of require-
ments, and in particular of requirements written as `If . . . then . . . ' statements, it
is convenient to introduce the following notation. I use m+ to describe a proposition
about the presence of a mental state, e.g. m ∈ C; and m− to describe a proposition
about the absence of a mental state, e.g. m /∈ C. When I consider sets of mental
states M = {m, n, . . . } I use:
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(i) c+ for a conjunction of presences m+, n+, . . . for M ,
(ii) c− for a conjunction of absences m−, n−, . . . for M ,
(iii) d+ for a disjunction of presences m+, n+, . . . for M ,
(iv) and d− for a disjunction of absences m−, n−, . . . for M .
I can now ask what are the diﬀerent types of `If . . . then . . . ' statements whose
consequent is a proposition about a single mental state and the antecedent is a
conjunction of mental states. I identify four requirement types.
(i) A completeness requirement is of the form `if c− then m+'. For example,
if (x, y,) /∈ C and (y, x,) /∈ C then (x, y,∼) ∈ C is a completeness
requirement for preferences.
(ii) A consistency requirement is of the form `if c+ then m−'. For example,
if (x1, x2,) ∈ C and (x3, x4,) ∈ C and `. . . ' and (xn−1, xn,) ∈ C
then (xn, x1,) /∈ C is a consistency requirement for preferences, i.e.
acyclicity of preferences.
(iii) A closedness requirement is of the form `if c+ then m+'. For example,
if (x, y,) ∈ C and (y, z,) ∈ C then (x, z,) ∈ C is a closedness
requirement for preferences, i.e. transitivity of preferences.
(iv) A negative closedness requirement is of the form `if c− thenm−' (equival-
ently, `if m+ then d+'). For example, if (y, x,) /∈ C and (z, y,) /∈ C
then (z, x,) /∈ C is a negative closedness requirement for preferences,
i.e. negative transitivity.
What is particular about the four-type taxonomy is that it represents all possible
ways of linking M to a single mental state m and that analogously rules specify all
`correct' ways of linking premises to a single conclusion. I represent these types as
a table of `If . . . then . . . ' statements linking M to a single mental state m shown
as Table 1. Rows are diﬀerent antecedents and columns are diﬀerent consequents.
The contrapositives of these requirements can also be written as a table of `If . . .
then . . . ' statements shown as Table 2.
Apart from one exception, one cannot express a requirement belonging to one
type in the four-type taxonomy T as a requirement belonging to another type in
T . The exception is the case of closedness and negative closedness requirement
in which the antecedent is a singleton because if we switch this antecedent with
the consequent and negate them, closedness becomes a negative closedness. More
precisely:
10
then
if
m+ m−
c+ closedness consistency
c− completeness negative closedness
Table 1.1: A four-type taxonomy of requirements.
then
if
d+ d−
m+ negative closedness consistency
m− completeness closedness
Table 1.2: A four-type taxonomy of requirements again.
Deﬁnition 1.4. A taxonomy of requirements T is weakly exclusive if, if a re-
quirement R is of one type in T then it is not of any other type in T , i.e. R∩R′ = ∅
for any distinct requirement types R,R′ ∈ T .
Proposition 1.1. Let T be a taxonomy consisting of completeness, consistency,
closedness, and negative closedness requirements. T is weakly exclusive, except in
the case of a closedness or negative closedness requirement in which the antecedent
is a singleton.
Can any possible single requirement be expressed as a conjunction of require-
ments in the four-type taxonomy? To show this, it is useful to consider the following
more explicit way of conceptualising the four-type taxonomy:
(i) A requirement R is a completeness requirement if it is of the form `if absence of
all elements of M \ {m} then presence of m' with respect to a set of mental
states M ⊆M with M 6=∅ and m ∈M ; formally: M ∩ C 6= ∅.
(ii) A requirement R is a consistency requirement if it is of the form `if presence of
all elements of M \ {m} then absence of m' with respect to a set of mental
states M ⊆M with M 6=∅ and m ∈M ; formally: ¬M ⊆ C.
(iii) A requirement R is a closedness requirement if it is of the form `if presence
of all elements of M then presence of m' with respect to a set of mental
states M ⊂ M with M 6=∅ and a mental state m ∈ M with m/∈M ; formally:
M ⊆ C ⇒ m ∈ C.
(iv) A requirement R is a negative closedness requirement if it is of the form `if
absence of all elements of M then absence of m' (equivalently, `if presence of
m then presence of at least one element of M ') with respect to a set of mental
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states M ⊂ M with M 6=∅ and a mental state m ∈ M with m/∈M ; formally:
M ∩ C = ∅ ⇒ m /∈ C.
Note two things. The ﬁrst is that there is a tight relationship between completeness
and consistency requirements and between closedeness and negative closedness re-
quirements. For any givenM , there is exactly one completeness and one consistency
requirement with respect to M . Similarly, for any given M and m, there is exactly
one closedness and one negative closedness requirement with respect toM andm. A
completeness requirement says that if all but one of the elements of M are not in C,
then the remaining element is in C. A consistency requirement says that if all but
one of the elements of M are in C, then the remaining element is not in C. What
one of the two requirements says about C, the other says about the complement of
C. Similarly, a closedness requirement says that if all the elements of M are in C,
then m is in C whereas negative closedness says that if all the elements of M are
not in C, then m is not in C. What one of the two requirements says about C,
the other says about the complement of C. A special case is that if M \ {m} is a
singleton, the contrapositive of a closednesss requirement is a negative closedness
requirement, hence Prop. 1. More formally:
Deﬁnition 1.5. For any two requirements R and R′, R is the dual of R′ if, for all
C ∈ C, C ∈ R if and only ifM\ C ∈ R′.
The second is that, by deﬁnition, a requirement allows some set of constitutions
R. Therefore, it rules out some set of constitutions, i.e. the complement of the
allowed constitutions (i.e. R′ = M \ C). Some requirements rule out exactly one
constitution: (i) ∅ can be ruled out by a completeness requirement, (ii) M can
be ruled out by a consistency requirement, (iii) M \ {m} can be ruled out by a
closedness requirement, and (iv) {m} can be ruled out by a negative closedness
requirement. And since any requirement can be understood by the constitutions it
rules out, every possible requirement can be written as a conjunction of requirements
that rule out exactly one constitution.
Deﬁnition 1.6. A taxonomy of requirements is weakly exhaustive if every pos-
sible single requirement is a conjunction of requirements from the taxonomy.2
2Weak exhaustiveness implies a notion of exhaustiveness from which exhaustiveness is weak
and weak exclusiveness implies a notion of exclusiveness from which exclusiveness is weak. I state
them for completeness. A taxonomy is (i) strongly exhaustive if every possible single requirement
is of one of the types, i.e.
⋃
R∈T R contains all requirements R, and (ii) strongly exclusive if no
requirement of one type is a conjunction of requirements of other types, i.e. no requirement in
some R ∈ T is the conjunction of a set of requirements, i.e. S ⊆ ⋃R′∈T\RR′.
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then
if
c+ d+ d− c−
c+ (1) (2) (3) (4)
d+ (5) (6) (7) (8)
d− (9) (10) (11) (12)
c− (13) (14) (15) (16)
Table 1.3: An expanded table of `If . . . then . . . ' statements.
then
if
c+ d+ d− c−
c+ R1 R2 R3 R4
d+ R5 R6 R4 R7
d− R8 R9 R1 R5
c− R9 R10 R2 R6
Table 1.4: A ten-type taxonomy of requirements.
Proposition 1.2. Let T be a taxonomy consisting of completeness, consistency,
closedness, and negative closedness requirements. T is weakly exhaustive if and only
ifM has no more than three mental states.
What are some of the requirement types that are not in the four-type taxonomy?
To answer this consider an expanded table of `If . . . then . . . ' statements linking
one set M to another set N shown as Table 3.
What are the requirement types in this table? Since we are concerned only with
formal structure, we can transpose M and N . This gives us 10 requirement types
(Table 4). (1) and (11), (2) and (15), (4) and (7), (5) and (12), (6) and (16), and
(10) and (13) are equivalent. This gives us 6 requirement types. Each of (3), (8),
(9), or (14) is its own equivalent. This gives us 4 additional requirement types.
Can any of these be expressed as a conjunction of requirements in the taxonomy?
In particular,R2,R3, andR10 cannot be expressed as a conjunction of requirements
in T . These are the requirements with the form `if c then d'. This result motivates
the following single type of requirement called conditional completeness requirement.
Deﬁnition 1.7. A requirement R is a conditional completeness requirement if
it is of the form `if presence of all elements ofM then presence of at least one element
of N ' with respect to a pair of sets of mental states M,N ⊆ M with M ∩ N = ∅
and M,N 6= ∅; formally: M ⊆ C ⇒ N ∩ C 6= ∅.
One obtains this type of requirement if she relaxes the antecedent of the negat-
ive closedness requirement in the original form to be a nonempty set N of mental
states. Using the simpliﬁed notation introduced at the beginning of this section,
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this requirement is of the form `if c+ then d+'. The following type of requirement
is a generalised version of conditional-completeness requirements which no longer
impose that M,N 6= ∅ but that M ∪N 6= ∅ called a uniﬁed requirement.
Deﬁnition 1.8. A requirement R is a uniﬁed requirement if it is of the form
`if presence of all elements of M then presence of at least one element of N ' with
respect to a pair of sets of mental statesM,N ⊆M withM∩N = ∅ andM∪N 6= ∅;
formally: M ⊆ C ⇒ N ∩ C 6= ∅.
Remark 1.2. This requirement is its own dual. The uniﬁed requirement says that if
all the elements of M are in C, then some m from N is in C. The contrapositive of
this is: If no element of N is in C, then some element of M is not in C, i.e. if all
elements of N are not in C, then some element of M is not in C, i.e. the `dual'.
All types of requirement considered above are special cases of this type.
Proposition 1.3. Uniﬁed requirements generalise completeness, consistency, closed-
ness, and negative closedness requirements.
A special case of the requirement considered above is the requirement that im-
poses N =M\M . This requirement uniquely rules out M . Since any requirement
can be understood by the constitutions it rules out, every possible requirement can
be written as a conjunction of requirements that rule out exactly one constitution. I
will now show that every possible single requirement is a conjunction of generalised
requirements of this type with a ﬁnite number of mental states.
Proposition 1.4. Let T be a taxonomy consisting of uniﬁed requirements. T is
weakly exhaustive ifM has a ﬁnite number of mental states.
So every requirement of a theory can be written as conjunctions of requirements
from T as deﬁned above.
1.4 Theories of rationality
Note that the deﬁnition of a requirement treats requirements in a generic way; a
requirement is not necessarily a requirement of rationality, or bound to a speciﬁc the-
ory of rationality. Rationality is one of many possible sources of requirements: other
sources of requirements might be morality, prudence, fashion, or Catholicism.3 More
precisely, given a mental structure (L,A), a theory of rationality requirements is
3See also (2013, p. 116)
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a given set T of constitutions which are deemed rational.4 I will deﬁne a theory of
rationality by its requirements.5
Deﬁnition 1.9. A theory of rationality requirements is a requirement, denoted
T ⊆ C. A constitution C is:
1. EITHER (T )-rational if C ∈ T .
2. OR (T )-irrational if C /∈ T .
Remark 1.3. By inspection of Deﬁnition 1.9, one observes that:
1. if T = C, then the theory is tautological.
2. if T = ∅, then the theory is contradictory.
Deﬁnition 1.10. A requirement R is called a requirement of theory T or simply
a T -requirement if R follows from T , i.e. T ⊆ R.
Remark 1.4. Given a theory T , a constitution is T -rational iﬀ it satisﬁes all T -
requirements.
I now use the analysis of the formal structure of requirements above and discuss
its use in two examples of theories of rationality: (i) Broome's philosophical analysis
of rationality and (ii) rational choice theory under certainty. Taking inspiration from
Broome's analysis of rationality I develop a `Broomean' version of rational choice.
1.4.1 Broome's analysis
Broome is primarily interested in representing the agent's internal language relev-
ant to practical reasoning. Broome's intuition is that you reason with the marked
contents of your mental states expressed in a natural language (2013, pp. 253-4).
The marked content is a pair that consists of a marker that speciﬁes a type of at-
titude and the proposition. Since Broome's analysis is concerned with the kind of
reasoning that operates on mental states that correspond to marked contents, I use
a simple model in which mental states represent the marked contents relevant to
practical reasoning. These mental states are formed by the sets:
1. L = {p, q, ...} which is suﬃciently rich as to contain all relevant propositions,
and
4Informally, a theory of rationality is given by its requirements. Since the conjunction of
requirements of a theory is again required, one can form the conjunction of all requirements of the
theory which yields the theory's strongest requirement, a particular set of constitutions which are
allowed according to that theory.
5In these cases, requirements are internal to a theory or a conception of rationality
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2. A = {int, bel} which consists of the intention and belief attitudes.
His analysis focuses on beliefs and intentions, aiming to keep his analysis within
the domain of internal reasoning prior to any action. There are other attitudes as
well such as desires, hopes, and others. One could even speak of graded beliefs and
desires as such. But beliefs and intentions are essential for practical reasoning: a
person will at least have the attitude of belief and of intention towards propositions
when engaging with practical reasoning, such as the belief that it is sunny or the
intention that I go sailing.6
Here are some examples:
 the mental state (p, int) describes an intention to do something.
For example saying to yourself I shall go sailing is normally the way in which you
express in language your intention to go sailing. The convention I adopt is to use
the variables p, q, ... to refer generically to propositions in L, and text in quotes such
as it rains, I shall go biking, if it rains tomorrow, then the game will not take
place to express, in language, the marked contents of your attitudes. I use italics
such as it rains, I go sailing, if it rains tomorrow then the game will not take place,...
to denote the unmarked content of your attitudes. So I go sailing is the unmarked
content of the intention in the example and (I go sailing, int) is the marked content
of this intention.
 the mental state (p, bel) describes a belief that something is the case.
For example saying to yourself if it rains tomorrow, then the game will not take
place is normally the way in which you express this belief of yours. In the sentence
the marker is silent.7 The marked content of this belief is (if it rains tomorrow then
the game will not take place, bel).
Broome discusses various basic theoretical and practical rationality requirements,
in particular, themodus ponens, non-contradiction of beliefs,means-end, non-contradiction
of intentions, and enkrasia requirements. I now give examples of these schemas of
requirements:
 The modus ponens requirement schema:
if {(p, bel), (if p then q, bel)} ⊆ C, then (q, bel) ∈ C
6In discussing practical reasoning in terms of beliefs and intentions, Broome is following a
common practice among philosophers. An analysis of attitudes that is focused on intentions appears
in (Bratman, 1987). Bratman thinks of intentions as some sort of plans towards the action.
7It is a intrinsic property of English that you can express a belief without a marker (2013, pp.
254-5).
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 The non-contradiction of beliefs requirement schema:
if (p, bel) ∈ C, then (not p, bel) /∈ C
Broome extends his analysis of requirements to apply to intentions.
 The means-end requirement schema:
if {(p, int), (q is a means implied by p, bel), (q is up to me, bel)} ⊆ C, then
(q, int) ∈ C
 The non-contradiction of intentions requirement schema:
if (p, int) ∈ C, then (not p , int) /∈ C
Enkrasia is another requirement of practical rationality. It involves a belief that you
ought to do something, a `normative' belief, and an intention to do it.8
 The enkrasia requirement schema:
if {(ought to p, bel), (p is up to me, bel)} ⊆ C, then (p, int) ∈ C
1.4.2 Rational Choice
In this section, I restrict my analysis to the simplest theory of rational choice:
rational choice under certainty, others are decision theory under uncertainty and
game theory.9,10 In the standard non-Broomean versions of the theory, a set of all
possible options is given. Let X be the given set of all possible options in the
standard theory. Typically a single option, e.g. apple, banana, is denoted x, y, ...
and so on.
These are the objects of preference and choice. Preferences are represented as
binary relations on pairs of options. For mathematical convenience, economists usu-
ally start from the weak preference relation and derive the strict preference relation
and the indiﬀerence relation. Strict preference relations, indiﬀerence relations, and
weak preference relations are all binary relations on X, where X is a set of objects of
choice and not propositions. Moreover, choices are represented as choice functions
that assign the set of `choiceworthy' objects from the feasible set.
8Ought has a normative content here. It is often used in two senses. Oughts that refer to
all-things-considered reasons and oughts that refer to speciﬁc reasons. Oughts in the ﬁrst sense
outweigh all other reasons the agent might have, whereas oughts in the second sense do not, and
are often stated as `have reason'. Broome leaves open whether rationality is normative, whether
it generates normative oughts (2013, p. 146).
9For example, the treatment of rational choice under certainty in (Kreps, 1988)
10e.g. (Savage, 1954) and (Aumann, 1999) respectively.
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Deﬁnition 1.11. Let ≥ be a weak preference relation on X. Then deﬁne the strict
preference relation > and the indiﬀerence relation ≡ on X as follows:
 x > y if and only if x ≥ y and not y ≥ x, and
 x ≡ y if and only if x ≥ y and y ≥ x.
In the standard theory of choice, transitivity and completeness are usually formu-
lated in terms of weak preference relations as deﬁned above. For any relation ≥ on
X, the requirement of transitivity requires that ≥ is transitive and the requirement
of completeness that it is complete.
 The relation ≥ is transitive if, for any x, y, z in the set X, if x ≥ y and y ≥ z,
then x ≥ z.
 The relation ≥ is complete if, for any x, y in the set X, either x ≥ y or y ≥ x.
In my Broomean model, I identify the set of options, e.g. apple, banana, with a
set of propositions of possible consequences of choice, e.g. I get apple, I get banana,
and so on. Formally, X is the set of all possible propositions of consequences of
choice. Any such proposition is denoted x. These propositions are the objects of
psychological attitudes and not mathematical objects such as relations or functions.
Propositions fromX form the domain of the attitude of preference, the domain of the
attitude of indiﬀerence, and the domain of the attitude of intention to choose. Strict
preferences, indiﬀerences and intentions to choose are the counterpart of binary
relations and choice functions in standard versions of the theory.
Preferences are two-place attitudes, denoted  and ∼. The following are the two
mental states that describe preference and indiﬀerence attitudes:
 the mental state (x , y ,) describes any preference, e.g the preference (I get
apples, I get bananas, ) given that apples and bananas are objects of choice.
 the mental state (x , y ,∼) describes any indiﬀerence, e.g the indiﬀerence (I get
apples, I get bananas, ∼) given that apples and bananas are objects of choice.
Strict preferences and indiﬀerences seem to be the natural ways for expressing our
comparative attitudes with language. The marked contents of preferences can be
understood in two ways; either preferences as comparative desires or as beliefs about
betterness. For example, saying to yourself Rather I get x than I get y is one of
the possibles ways of expressing a preference between x and y. The other is saying
to yourself getting x is better than getting y. I say earlier that economists often
use weak preference relations for mathematical convenience. In practice, we can
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express a weak preference relation with the proposition x is at least as good as y.
This proposition is the object of a belief. If we do this, then we do not need to
have a preference attitude as the content of this proposition is not the content of
a mental state but that of a disjunction of mental states: a strict preference and
indiﬀerence. If preferences are interpreted as a comparative desire, then this is an
important constraint for expressing weak preferences with language.
Intentions are the Broomean counterpart of choice. Intentions are naturally
understood as the ﬁnal output of a mental process prior to any choice. The following
mental state describe these intentions:
 the mental state (x , int) describes an intention to choose something, e.g the
intention (I get apples, int) given that apples are an object of choice.
For example, saying to yourself I shall get x is normally the way in which you
express your intention to get x. Intentions are in many ways diﬀerent from desires
in guiding our actions. One important way in which they diﬀer is that intentions
persist while this is not so for desires. So an intention that is caused by a preference
gives particular meaning to preferences, one that economists assume.
Usually your preferences and intentions depend on your beliefs about the set of
objects which are available to you. I identify each non-empty subset of X with a
proposition about the feasibility of a choice set. Formally, Y denotes any nonempty
subset of X, i.e. any element of 2X \ {∅}. The following example illustrates this
belief:
 the mental state (Y , bel) describes a belief in a feasible set, e.g the belief (I get
either apples or bananas, bel) given that the choice set Y = {x, y} contains
only apples and bananas as objects of choice.
Beliefs are commonly expressed in the indicative mood (2013, p. 268). For example
in the case in which Y = {x, y}, the agent says to herself I can only get either x or
y which is normally the way in which you express in language your belief that you
can only get either x or y.
Note that feasibility beliefs and intentions are absent from standard formulations
of rational-choice models. Feasibility beliefs are absent from standard choice models,
because of the background assumption that the feasible set is automatically known.
Moreover, intentions are absent from these models as these models aim to describe
observable behaviour. Feasibility beliefs are needed to explain intentions and belong
to any complete description of the agent's mind.
One can now construct the mental states of rational choice from combinations
of:
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1. the set L = X ∪ 2X \ {∅} which contains all choice related propositions, and
2. the set A = {int, bel,,∼} which contains all choice related attitudes, i.e. the
attitude of intention, belief, strict preference and indiﬀerence.
For any x, y ∈ X and Y ⊂ X, the set of all rational choice mental states consists of
the following four types of mental states:
1. (x , y ,) describes a preference, e.g. the agent says to herself Rather I get x
than I get y,
2. (x , y ,∼) describes an indiﬀerence, e.g. the agent says to herself Just as well
I get x as I get y,
3. (x , int) describes an intention to choose, e.g. the agent says to herself I shall
get x , and
4. (Y , bel) describes a belief in a feasible set, e.g. in the case that Y = {x, y}
the agent says to herself I can only get either x or y.
I can now present my non-standard rational choice axiomatisation on the above set of
mental states. Eight requirements (R1-R8) make together the proposed `Broomean'
rational choice. There are two points to made about this axiomatisation. First,
binary relations are separate mathematical objects and cannot be in the set A =
{int, bel,,∼} of attitudes. The set of all mental states which can be formed by the
pair of attitudes (,∼) is the set M(,∼) = {(x, y, a) : x, y ∈ X and a ∈ {,∼}}.
The second is that a weak preference relation ≥ on X cannot be given by a single
attitude but by the disjunction of strict preference and indiﬀerence attitudes. To
this end, I will relate the concept of weak preference to that of constitutions.
Deﬁnition 1.12. Given your mental structure (L,A), a constitution C for the above
model is compatible with the binary relation ≥ if C ∩M(,∼) = {(x, y,) :x, y ∈ X
and x > y} ∪ {(x, y,∼) : x, y ∈ X and x ≡ y}.
Theorem 1.1. A constitution C is compatible with some weak preference relation
iﬀ for all x, y ∈ X, C satisﬁes the three requirement schemas:
 R2 asymmetry of preference: if (x, y,) ∈ C then (y, x,) /∈ C (a consistency
requirement)
 R3 (incompatibility of preference and indiﬀerence): if (x, y,) ∈ C then (x, y,∼) /∈
C (a consistency requirement)
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 R4 (symmetry of indiﬀerence): if (x, y,∼) ∈ C then (y, x,∼) ∈ C (a closedness
requirement)
The theorem says that incompatibility of any constitution with weak prefer-
ence can be attributed to violations of three implicit requirements on strict prefer-
ences and indiﬀerence attitudes. Given theorem 1.1, one can recast the requirement
schemas transitivity and completeness of weak preference relations by the pair (,∼)
of attitudes. Transitivity of weak preferences is a conjunction of four transitivity
requirement schemas, i.e. one for each pair of preference and indiﬀerence attitudes.
Proposition 1.5. A constitution C is compatible with some transitive weak prefer-
ence relation iﬀ (i) for all x, y ∈ X, C satisﬁes R2, R3, R4 in Th. 1.1, and (ii) for
all x, y, z ∈ X it satisﬁes the four requirement schemas:
 R1 transitivity of strict preference:if {(x, y,) , (y, z,)} ⊆ C then (x, z,) ∈
C (a closedness requirement)
 R1∼ transitivity of indiﬀerence: if {(x, y,∼) , (y, z,∼)} ⊆ C then (x, z,∼) ∈ C
(a closedness requirement)
 R1∼ PItransitivity: if {(x, y,) , (y, z,∼)} ⊆ C then (x, z,) ∈ C (a closed-
ness requirement)
 R1∼ IPtransitivity: if {(x, y,∼) , (y, z,)} ⊆ C then (x, z,) ∈ C (a closed-
ness requirement)
Proposition 1.6. A constitution C is compatible with some complete weak prefer-
ence relation iﬀ for all x, y ∈ X, C satisﬁes R2, R3, R4 in Th. 1.1 and the following
requirement schema:
 R5 completeness of preferences: if (x, y,) /∈ C and (y, x,) /∈ C, then (x, y,∼) ∈
C (a completeness requirement)
Corollary 1.1. Deﬁne the relation ≥ as reﬂexive if, for any x in the set X, x ≥ x.
A constitution C is compatible with some reﬂexive and complete weak preference
relation iﬀ for all x ∈ X, C satisﬁes R2, R3, R4 in Th. 1.1, R5 and the following
requirement schema:
 R5+ reﬂexivity of indiﬀerence: if (x, x,∼) ∈ C then (x, x,∼) ∈ C (a closedness
requirement)
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R1-R5 ensure fully classical preferences. Given Proposition 1.6, one can simplify
transitivity of weak preferences to a more economical version of transitivity given
completeness with one requirement instead of four.
Proposition 1.7. A constitution C is compatible with some complete and transitive
weak preference relation iﬀ (i) for all x, y ∈ X, C satisﬁes R2, R3, R4 in Th. 1.1
and R5 of Prop. 1.6, and (ii) for all x, y, z ∈ X it satisﬁes the following requirement
schema:
 R1+ negative transitivity: if (y, x,) /∈ C and (z, y,) /∈ C then (z, x,) /∈ C
(a negative closedness requirement)
These results suggest diﬀerent interpretations of weak preferences. On the ﬁrst
interpretation, strict preference and indiﬀerence are primitive, non-composite atti-
tudes and therefore weak preference relations are derived from them. Completeness
is not an implicit requirement on preferences. On the second interpretation, strict
preferences are truly primitive and given completeness, indiﬀerences are derived from
the absence of strict preferences. A weak preference relation is therefore understood
as the complement of the primitive strict preference relation. Given completeness,
transitivity of weak preferences can be reduced to negative transitivity.11
But the schemas of Th. 1.1 seem to be rationality requirements on preferences in
a way that completeness is not. Completeness is questionable from both a descriptive
and a normative point of view. Comparing propositions from X is not always
possible and in some cases it is non-desirable. The absence of a preference could
express indiﬀerence or non-comparability. By describing preference relations by the
pair (,∼) one accounts for this diﬀerence.
The next two requirement schemas, R6 and R7, exclude contradictory intentions
or feasibility beliefs:
 For distinct feasible sets Y, Y ′ ∈ 2X \ {∅}:
R6 No conﬂicting feasibility beliefs : if (Y, bel) ∈ C then (Y ′, bel) /∈ C (a con-
sistency requirement)
 For distinct options x, y ∈ X :
R7 No conﬂicting intentions : if (x, int) ∈ C then (y, int) /∈ C (a consistency
requirement)
11A well known treatment of the second interpretation is that of Savage. His deﬁnition (1954, p.
18) of the weak preference relation x is not preferred to y is built on a strict preference and two
implicit requirements on preferences: asymmetry of preferences and completeness. Starting with
strict preference as the only primitive, Savage is able to derive its complement strict preference
relation x is not preferred to y, i.e. (x, y,) /∈ C assuming that strict preferences are non-
contradictory and indiﬀerence to be the absence of strict preferences in both directions.
22
The next requirement schema connects feasibility beliefs and preferences to inten-
tions to choose. Consider this as the counterpart of enkrasia in economic theory.
Rational choice theory as a theory of practical rationality must contain a kind of
requirement which is about the relationship between preferences, as the natural
primitive input of the theory, and intention to choose, as the ﬁnal output of those
preferences. Informally this requirement schema states that if you believe that you
can get x or y and most prefer to get x, then you intend to get x. In the language
of the theory,
 For any feasible set Y ⊆ X and x ∈ Y :
R8 Simple economic enkrasia: if (Y, bel) ∈ C, (x, y,) ∈ C for all y ∈
Y \ {x}, then (x, int) ∈ C (a closedness requirement)
Economic enkrasia can be formulated in a more general way to cover the case of
ties between diﬀerent top-ranked feasible options. The following more general re-
quirement schema achieves this by replacing the top option x by a non-empty set of
top options Z. In these cases, there can be more than one intention that satisfy the
requirement.
 For any feasible set Y ⊆ X and non-empty set Z ⊆ Y :
R8 economic enkrasia: if (Y, bel) ∈ C, (x, y,) ∈ C for all x ∈ Z, y ∈ Y \ Z,
and (x, y,∼) ∈ C for all distinct x, y ∈ Z, then (x, int) ∈ C for some x ∈ Z
(a conditional completeness requirement)
Informally, this requirement schema says that if you believe the feasible set to be
Y and prefer options in Z to options in Y \ Z and view options in Z as mutually
indiﬀerent, then you intend some option in Z. Conventional rational choice theory
analyses choice in terms of choice acts directly rather than in terms of intentions
prior to any action. Choice acts are mathematically described by choice functions
which are usually assumed to pick a non-empty set of `choiceworthy' options. This
is to deal with indiﬀerence. If two or more options are choiceworthy, rational choice
theory doesn't say anything about which should be chosen. In this Broomean version
of the theory, however, the agent needs to have an intention to get a single object
from X. This issue is discussed in relation to Buridan's ass paradox in Chapter 2.
I presented a `Broomean' version of rational choice that consists of eight re-
quirements. Requirements R1-R7 correspond to one of the four types of the re-
quirement while R8 is a conditional completeness requirement. R1-R5 ensure fully
classical preferences and R6-R7 exclude contradictory intentions or feasibility be-
liefs. Of them all, R8 is the most `Broomean' one; the choice-theoretic counterpart
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of Broome's ordinary enkrasia. It diﬀers from ordinary enkrasia in that intentions
respond to preferences and feasibility beliefs rather than ought-beliefs. R8 reﬂects
the classical preference-maximisation hypothesis: you intend something that you
most prefer among what you believe to be feasible.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter started with an observation about the structural analogy that exists
between some requirement types written in `If . . . then . . . ' form and rules of
reasoning. Requirements whose consequent is a proposition about a single mental
state and antecedent is a proposition about a set of mental states are structurally
analogous to rules that specify `correct' ways of deriving a conclusion from a set of
premises.12 I presented a novel taxonomy of all requirement types that have this
property. I showed that, except for a particular case, if a requirement is of one type
in the four-type taxonomy then it is not of any other type in the taxonomy.
I then used the taxonomy of requirements to discuss rational choice as a main
example of a theory of rationality requirements. This simple version of rational
choice has been inspired by Broome's philosophical analysis of mental states and
rationality. The next chapter uses this taxonomy to show that certain types of
requirement cannot be reached by a particular process of reasoning.
1.6 Appendix
Proof of Prop. 1.1. Part 1: Notice:
(i) every completeness requirement forbids C = ∅ and permits C =M
(ii) every consistency requirement permits C = ∅ and forbids C =M
(iii) every closedness requirement permits C = ∅ and permits C =M
(iv) every negative closedness requirement permits C = ∅ and permits C =M.
From this it follows immediately that the only types than can possibly overlap
are closedness and negative closedness requirements.
Part 2: Let R be a closedenss requirement speciﬁed for M , m. Let R′ be a
negative closedness requirement speciﬁed for M ′, m′. R says: if all elements of M
12Theories such as the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón et al., 1985; Gärdenfors,
1988) and non-Bayesian models of preference revision Grüne-Yanoﬀ and Hansson (2009) represent
diﬀerent ways of changing by expanding or contracting the current set of mental states in light
of new information. My analysis which is on the formal structure of conditional statements can
be used to classify logical concepts such as the expansion, contraction, and revision in revision
theories.
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are in C, then m is in C. R′ says: if all elements ofM ′ are not in C, then m′ is not in
C. The contrapositive form of R′ says: if m′ is in C, then some element of M ′ is in
C. Given M and m, it's possible to restate R as a negative closedness requirement
only if M is a singleton, i.e. M = {m∗}. In this case I can set m′ = m∗, M ′ = {m},
and then R′ and R are equivalent.
Proof of Prop. 1.2. Part 1: I suppose that M contains either one or two or three
mental states and prove that T is weakly exhaustive.
Claim 1 : IfM has one or two or three mental states, then for any constitution
C, there is some requirement R in the taxonomy that uniquely rules out C.
Proof: By deﬁnition, a requirement allows some set of constitutions R. There-
fore, it rules out some set of constitutions, i.e. the complement of the allowed
constitutions (i.e. R′ = M \ C). A requirement uniquely rules out a constitution
C if it rules out C and no other constitution C ′. Let M be the set of all mental
states and C = 2M be the set of all possible constitutions. Fix the setM such that
it contains either one mental state, or two mental states, or three mental states.
Consider any requirement R from the taxonomy T that consists of completeness,
consistency, closedness, and negative closedness requirements denoted Rcom, Rcon,
Rclo, and Rnclo respectively:
Rcom completeness requirements: Consider a completeness requirement with
M ⊂ M, i.e. there is some k ∈ M such that k /∈ M . This requirement rules
out the constitution ∅, but it also rules out {k}. So the only kind of completeness
requirement that can rule out exactly one constitution is one with M = M. This
rules out ∅ and nothing else.
Rcon consistency requirements: By duality with Rcom, the only kind of consist-
ency requirement that can rule out exactly one constitution is one with M = M.
This rules outM and nothing else.
Rclo closedness requirements: Consider a closedness requirement with M ∪
{m} ⊂ M, i.e. there is some k ∈ M such that k /∈ M and k 6= m. This re-
quirement rules outM , but it also rules outM ∪{k}. So the only kind of closedness
requirement that can rule out exactly one constitution is one with M ∪ {m} =M.
This requirement rules outM\ {m} and nothing else.
Rnclo negative closedness requirements: By duality with Rclo, the only kind
of negative closedness requirement that can rule out exactly one constitution is one
with M ∪ {m} =M. This requirement rules out {m} and nothing else.
Implications of this for the question of whether every possible requirement is a
conjunction of requirements of types Rcom, Rcon, Rclo, and Rnclo: Any require-
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ment can be described by the set of mental states that it rules out. So if each mental
state in M is uniquely ruled out by some requirement in the taxonomy, we know
that every possible requirement is a conjunction of requirements in the taxonomy.
From the previous results, for any M : (a) ∅ can be ruled out by a completeness
requirement, (b) M can be ruled out by a consistency requirement, (c) M \ {m}
can be ruled out by a closedness requirement, and (d) {m} can be ruled out by
a negative closedness requirement. So each of the eight possible constitutions is
uniquely ruled out by at least one requirement of the taxonomy.
It follows that if M contains no more than three mental states, every possible
constitution can be uniquely ruled out by some requirement from the taxonomy, and
so every possible requirement is equivalent to a conjunction of requirements from
the taxonomy.
Part 2: I want to prove that if T is weakly exhaustive, thenM contains at most
three mental states. I prove this by contraposition. I suppose thatM contains more
than three mental states and prove that T is not weakly exhaustive.
Claim 2: Consider any constitution C. IfM has more than three mental states,
then for some constitution C, there is no requirement R in the taxonomy that
uniquely rules out C.
Proof : LetM be the set of all mental states and C = 2M be the set of all possible
constitutions. Fix the setM such that it has more than three mental states. Suppose
M = {i, j, k, l}. Then the constitution C ′ = {k, l} cannot be uniquely ruled out by
any single requirement from the taxonomy. Now consider the requirement that rules
out only this constitution (in the example, the requirement that the constitution is
not {k, l}). We know that no requirement from the taxonomy uniquely rules out
C ′. So any conjunction of these requirements must either (a) not rule out C ′, or (b)
rule out C ′ and something else. So no conjunction of requirements is equivalent to
the requirement that rules out only C ′.
Proof of Prop. 1.3. Let the uniﬁed requirement be given relative to M,N ⊆ M
withM ∪N 6= ∅ such thatM ⊆ C ⇒ N ∩C 6= ∅. Then a uniﬁed requirement gener-
alises completeness, consistency, closedness, and negative closedness requirements.
If M = ∅ and N 6= ∅, then the uniﬁed requirement with respect to M and N
reduces to completeness with respect to N , that is N ∩ C 6= ∅.
If M 6= ∅ and N = ∅, then the uniﬁed requirement with respect to M and N
reduces to consistency with respect to M , that is ¬M ⊆ C.
If M 6= ∅ and N = {m}, then the uniﬁed requirement with respect to M and N
reduces to closedness with respect to M and m, that is M ⊆ C ⇒ m ∈ C.
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If M = {m} and N 6= ∅, then the uniﬁed requirement with respect to M and N
reduces to negative closedness with respect to N andm, that ism ∈ C ⇒ N∩C 6= ∅,
which is N ∩ C = ∅ ⇒ m /∈ C.
Thus each of requirements Rcom, Rcon, Rclo, and Rnclo is a special case of
the uniﬁed requirement.
Proof of Prop. 1.4. Suppose that M contains a ﬁnite number of mental states. I
prove that T is weakly exhaustive. It suﬃces to deﬁne the uniﬁed requirement
M ⊆ C ⇒ N ∩ C 6= ∅ with M ∩ N = ∅ and M ∪ N = M 6= ∅. This requirement
rules out M and nothing else. Since any requirement can be given by a pair of sets
of mental states M ⊆M, N ⊆M, each constitution fromM is uniquely ruled out
by some uniﬁed requirement. By the results in Prop. 1.2, (a) ∅ can be ruled out by a
uniﬁed requirement reduced to a completeness requirement, (b)M can be ruled out
by a uniﬁed requirement reduced to a consistency requirement, (c)M\{m} can be
ruled out by a uniﬁed requirement reduced to a closedness requirement, (d) {m} can
be ruled out by a uniﬁed requirement reduced to a negative closedness requirement.
Moreover, (e) any constitution M\M not speciﬁed above can be ruled out by at
least one of the other uniﬁed requirements.
Proof of Theorem. 1.1. The proof has two parts. First I consider any constitution
C that satisﬁes the three requirements above and show that there exists a binary
relation ≥ on X such that C is compatible with it. In the second part I suppose
that there exits a binary relation ≥ on X such that a constitution C is compatible
with it and show that C satisﬁes all the requirements above.
Part 1: Consider a constitution C such that for all x, y ∈ X, C satisﬁes asym-
metry of preference, incompatibility of preference and indiﬀerence, and symmetry
of indiﬀerence.
Claim 1 : For any given x, y ∈ X, one of the following is true:
(a) either C contains the strict preference (x, y,) and no other preferences and
indiﬀerences between x and y,
(b) or it contains the strict preference (y, x,) and no other preferences and
indiﬀerences between x and y,
(b) or it contains the indiﬀerences (x, y,∼) and (y, x,∼) and no other preferences
between x and y,
(c) or it does not contain any preferences or indiﬀerences between x and y.
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Proof : (a) Let (x, y,) be in C. By asymmetry, C cannot contain (y, x,). By
incompatibility C cannot contain (x, y,∼). By symmetry this implies that C cannot
contain (y, x,∼). So neither (y, x,) nor (y, x,∼) nor (x, y,∼) are in C.
(b) Let (y, x,) be in C. The proof that neither (x, y ) nor (x, y,∼) nor
(y, x,∼) are in C follows a similar logic.
(c) Let (x, y,∼) be in C. By symmetry, this implies that C contains (y, x,∼).
By incompatibility neither (x, y,) nor (y, x,) are in C.
(d) If neither (a) nor (b) nor (c) hold, then by previous results neither (y, x,)
nor (y, x,∼) nor (x, y ) nor (x, y,∼) are in C.
Claim 2 : For any given x, y ∈ X, the above constitution C is compatible with
some binary relation ≥.
Proof : I construct the relation ≥ from strict preferences and indiﬀerences using
the rule: for any x, y ∈ X, x ≥ y if and only if either (x, y,) ∈ C or (x, y,∼) ∈ C.
(a) Suppose that C contains (x, y,). Then neither (y, x,) nor (y, x,∼) are
in C. Then by construction, x ≥ y and not y ≥ x. By the deﬁnition of weak
preferences, x > y.
(b) Suppose that C contains (y, x,). The proof that C is compatible with
y > x follows a similar logic.
(c) Suppose that C contains (x, y,∼). Then C contains (y, x,∼). Then by
construction, x ≥ y and y ≥ x. By the deﬁnition of weak preferences, x ≡ y.
(d) Suppose that C contains neither (x, y,) nor (y, x,) nor (x, y,∼) nor
(y, x,∼). Then by construction, neither x ≥ y nor y ≥ x. Thus neither x > y
nor x ≡ y nor y > x nor y ≡ x.
Part 2: I suppose that some relation ≥ on X exists and that a constitution C is
compatible with it. Therefore, for any given x, y ∈ X, exactly one is true: (a) either
x ≥ y and not y ≥ x, (b) or y ≥ x and not x ≥ y, (c) or both x ≥ y and y ≥ x, (d)
or neither x ≥ y nor y ≥ x. I show that for each case, C satisﬁes all requirements
above.
(a) Suppose x ≥ y and not y ≥ x. Then by the deﬁnition of weak preferences,
x > y and neither y > x nor x ≡ y nor y ≡ x. Therefore, by compatibility of a
constitution with it, C∩M(,∼) = {(x, y,)}. Thus neither (y, x,) nor (y, x,∼) nor
(x, y,∼) are in C. Because (y, x,) is not in C, then asymmetry is satisﬁed. Because
(x, y,∼) is not in C, then incompatibility is satisﬁed. Because both (x, y,∼) and
(y, x,∼) are not in C, then symmetry is satisﬁed. Hence C satisﬁes the requirements.
(b) The proof that the compatible constitution C ∩M(,∼) is the set {(y, x,)}
and that it satisﬁes the requirements has a similar logic.
(c) Suppose x ≥ y and y ≥ x. Then by the deﬁnition of weak preferences,
28
x ≡ y and y ≡ x. By compatibility of a constitution with it, C ∩ M(,∼) =
{(x, y,∼), (y, x,∼)}. Thus neither (x, y,) nor (y, x,) are in C. Because both
(x, y,) and (y, x,) are not in C, then asymmetry is satisﬁed. Because neither
(x, y,) nor (y, x,) are in C, then incompatibility is satisﬁed. Because (x, y,∼)
and (y, x,∼) are in C, then symmetry is satisﬁed. Hence C satisﬁes the require-
ments.
(d) Suppose neither x ≥ y nor y ≥ x. By the deﬁnition of weak preferences,
neither x > y, nor y > x, nor y ≡ x, nor x ≡ y. By compatibility of a constitution
with it, C∩M(,∼) = ∅. Then symmetry, asymmetry, and incompatibility vacuously
hold.
Proof of Prop. 1.5. Part 1: The proof has two parts. In the ﬁrst part I suppose that
a constitution C is compatible with some transitive relation ≥, and show that C
satisﬁes all four transitivity requirements and the requirements R2, R3, R4 in Th.
1.1.
Consider any constitution C which is compatible with some weak preference
transitive relation ≥. By the results of Th. 1.1, C satisﬁes the requirements R2,
R3, R4. I now show that C satisﬁes all four transitivity requirements. I start with
the ﬁrst requirement.
Let (x, y,) and (y, z,) be in C. By compatibility of C, x > y and y > z. By
Def. 1.11, x ≥ y and not y ≥ x and y ≥ z and not z ≥ y. By transitivity of ≥, (a)
x ≥ z and (b) not z ≥ x. Therefore, x > z. Thus, by compatibility of C with it,
(x, z,) is in C. Hence C satisﬁes transitivity of strict preference.
By following this method, I can prove that C satisﬁes the rest of the requirements.
Part 2: In the second part, I suppose that for all x, y, z ∈ X, a constitution C
satisﬁes all four transitivity requirements and the requirements R2, R3, R4 in Th.
1.1. By Th. 1.1, C is compatible with some transitive weak preference relation ≥,
i.e. there exists a weak preference relation ≥ on X. Suppose x ≥ y and y ≥ z.
There are four possible cases: (1) x > y and y > z, (2) x > y and y ≡ z, (3) x ≡ y
and y > z, (4) x ≡ y and y ≡ z.
Suppose that x > y and y > z. By compatibility of C with ≥, then (x, y,) ∈ C
and (y, z,) ∈ C. Then by the ﬁrst requirement, (x, z,) ∈ C. So x ≥ z.
By following this method, I show that in the next three cases a constitution that
satisﬁes all four transitivity requirements is compatible with the transitive weak
preference relation x ≥ y, y ≥ z, and x ≥ z.
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Proof of Prop. 1.6. Part 1: Suppose that a constitution C is compatible with some
complete weak preference relation. By the results of Th. 1.1, C satisﬁes the require-
ments R2, R3, R4. I now prove that for all x, y ∈ X, C satisﬁes the completeness of
preferences requirement. Let ≥ be the relation that C is compatible with. Because
≥ is complete, for any x, y ∈ X, either x ≥ y or y ≥ x. By Def. 1.11, either x > y or
y > x or x ≡ y. By compatibility of C with ≥, either (x, y,) ∈ C or (x, y,) ∈ C
or (x, y,∼) ∈ C. Thus completeness of preferences.
Part 2: I now prove the only if part. I suppose that for all x, y ∈ X, C satisﬁes
the requirements R2, R3, R4 in Th. 1.1 and completeness of preferences, and prove
that C is compatible with some complete weak preference relation.
Since C satisﬁes the requirements R2, R3, R4 in Th. 1.1, C is compatible with
some weak preference relation ≥. By completeness of preferences, it is the case that
either (x, y,) ∈ C or (y, x,) ∈ C or (x, y,∼) ∈ C. By compatibility of C, then
either x > y or y > x or x ≡ y. By Def. 1.11, either x ≥ y and not y ≥ x or y ≥ x
and not x ≥ y or x ≥ y and y ≥ x. Thus either x ≥ y or y ≥ x, i.e. the relation is
complete.
Proof of Corollary 1.1. Part 1: Suppose that a constitution C is compatible with
some complete weak preference relation. By the results of Th. 1.1, C satisﬁes
the requirements R2, R3, R4, and by the results of Prop. 1.6, C satisﬁes the
requirement R5. I now prove that for all x ∈ X, C satisﬁes the reﬂexivity of
indiﬀerence requirement. Let ≥ be the relation that C is compatible with. Because
≥ is reﬂexive, for any x ∈ X, x ≥ x. By R5, either (x, x,) ∈ C or (x, x,∼) ∈ C.
By R1, (x, x,) /∈ C. Thus (x, x,∼) ∈ C, i.e. reﬂexivity of indiﬀerence.
Part 2: I now prove the only if part. I suppose that for all x ∈ X, C satisﬁes the
requirements R2, R3, R4 in Th. 1.1, R5 of Prop. 1.6, and reﬂexivity of indiﬀerence,
and prove that C is compatible with some reﬂexive and complete weak preference
relation.
Since C satisﬁes the requirements R2, R3, R4 in Th. 1.1, C is compatible with
some weak preference relation ≥. By completeness of preferences and by reﬂexivity
of indiﬀerence, it is the case that (x, x,∼) ∈ C. By compatibility of C, then x ≡ x.
By Def. 1.11, x ≥ x, i.e. the relation is complete.
Proof of Prop. 1.7. Part 1: Suppose that a constitution C is compatible with some
complete and transitive weak preference relation ≥. I prove that (i) for all x, y ∈ X,
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C satisﬁes the requirements R2, R3, R4 in Th. 1.1 and R5 of Prop. 1.6, and (ii) for
all x, y, z ∈ X it satisﬁes the negative transitivity requirement above.
(i) By the results of Th. 1.1 and Prop. 1.6, for all x, y ∈ X, C satisﬁes the
requirements R2, R3, R4 and R5.
(ii) Suppose that neither (y, x,) nor (z, y,) are in C. By compatibility of C,
not y > x and not z > y. By completeness of ≥, x ≥ y and y ≥ z. By transitivity of
≥, x ≥ z. By Def. 1.11, either x > z or x ≡ z. By compatibility of C with it, either
(x, z,) is in C or (x, z,∼) is in C. By R2, R3, R4 in Th. 1.1, (z, x,) /∈ C. By
asymmetry, if (x, z,) ∈ C then (z, x,) /∈ C. By symmetry, if (x, z,∼) ∈ C then
(z, x,∼) ∈ C. And by incompatibility, if (x, z,∼) ∈ C then (x, z,) /∈ C, and if
(z, x,∼) ∈ C then (z, x,) /∈ C. Hence (z, x,) /∈ C. This is negative transitivity.
Part 2: I now prove the only if part. I suppose that for all x, y ∈ X, C satisﬁes
the requirements R2, R3, R4, R5 and R1+, and prove that C is compatible with
some complete and transitive weak preference relation ≥.
By Prop. 1.5 and 1.6, there is some complete relation≥ such that C is compatible
with it. I now show that ≥ is transitive. Suppose x ≥ y and y ≥ z. By Def. 1.11,
either x > y or x ≡ y, and either y > z or y ≡ z. By compatibility of C with it, either
(x, y,) ∈ C or (x, y,∼) ∈ C, and either (y, z,) ∈ C or (y, z,∼) ∈ C. By the
requirements R2, R3, R4, (y, x,) /∈ C and (z, y,) /∈ C. By negative transitivity,
(z, x,) /∈ C. By completeness, the either (x, z,) ∈ C or (x, z,∼) ∈ C. By
compatibility of C, either x > z or x ≡ z. By Def.1.11, x ≥ z. Hence ≥ is
transitive.
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Chapter 2
A simple model of reasoning
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I have deﬁned rational choice as a theory of rationality requirements
on preferences, beliefs, and intentions and have described the diﬀerent types of re-
quirement they belong to. Chapter 2 focuses on mental processes, particularly the
mental process of reasoning by which a person constructs his preferences, beliefs,
and intentions. This chapter oﬀers a novel deﬁnition of the mental process of reas-
oning and addresses the main question of this thesis: whether and in what ways
one can come to satisfy rational choice requirements by that process. The model
is conceptually inspired by Broome's rigorous analysis of reasoning. For Broome,
reasoning is a conscious, explicit or verbal, and rule-guided mental process with pro-
positional attitudes that is distinct from mental processes which are subconscious
and automatic. His analysis is very well received among philosophers but is almost
unknown to economists and behavioural and cognitive scientists.
Behavioural and cognitive sciences have also suggested the distinction of the
mental processes between the slow, conscious, explicit or verbal, and rule-guided
processes of System 2 and the automatic, subpersonal, non-verbal, and associative
processes of System 1 (in particular, Wason and Evans 1974 and Kahneman 2003b,
2003a, and 2011). One central diﬀerence between the two systems is that System
2 processes are conducted in a language while System 1 processes, operating on
experiences and feelings, are not. In Kahneman's words,
the perceptual system and the intuitive operations of System 1 generate
impressions of the attributes of objects of perception and thought. These
impressions are not voluntary and need not be verbally explicit. In
contrast, judgments are always explicit and intentional, whether or not
they are overtly expressed. Thus, System 2 is involved in all judgments,
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whether they originate in impressions or in deliberate reasoning (2003a,
p. 1452).
My model can be regarded as an explicit description of the reasoning underlying
System 2.1 To capture the diﬀerence between the two systems: the conscious, verbal
and rule-guided System 2 and the automatic, non-verbal, and associative System 1,
I introduce the notion of propositional attitudes or mental states as I have deﬁned
them in Chapter 1. System 2 mode is propositional  it perceives the external
world by describing it syntactically  and System 1 mode is automatic. When the
decision maker enters the System 2 mode she processes propositions forming explicit
attitudes towards them. When she enters the System 1 mode she responds in a
non-verbal way to stimuli with her feelings and impressions that inform her explicit
attitudes.
Drawing on the classiﬁcation of the formal structure of requirements developed
in Chapter 1, I show in ﬁve theorems that System 2 can achieve certain types of
requirement, but not all of them. System 2 (i) is always capable of achieving closed-
ness requirements (e.g. transitivity), (ii) cannot achieve consistency requirements
(e.g. non-contradiction of preferences), and (iii) can achieve (a) Completeness (e.g.
completeness of preferences), or (b) negative closedness requirements (e.g. negative
transitivity), or (c) Conditional Completeness (e.g. Economic Enkrasia which is a
weak version of WARP with intention rather than choices), but usually only at the
cost of creating inconsistencies in the theory; and so, give a partially negative answer
to the question this thesis is about.
This model oﬀers an alternative to existing `System 1/ System 2' models in cog-
nitive sciences and behavioural economics. Behavioural economists often assume
that the mental processes by which people achieve the rationality requirements of
economic theory involve a ﬂawless System 2, and attribute the inability to con-
struct rational and context-independent preferences in accordance with these re-
quirements mainly to imperfections of System 1 which cuts in on System 2 reasoning.
The theorems, on the contrary, show that limitations of reasoning can also involve
System 2. A possible interpretation is that the mental processes (if they exist at
all) by which people achieve the rationality requirements of economic theory would
involve System 1 as well as System 2.
The chapter proceeds in the usual order: Section 2 presents the main ingredients
of the model and some examples of how it works. Subsection 2.4 reviews Broome's
philosophical analysis of reasoning and explains how it can be mapped into the
1Boghossian (2014) has also related his own philosophical account of theoretical reasoning with
existing literature on `System 1/ System 2'.
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model. Section 3 presents the results that answer the main question. Section 4
relates my formal analysis to existing literature, particularly `System 1/ System 2'
models in cognitive sciences and behavioural economics. Section 5 concludes. Proofs
omitted from the main text are in an appendix.
2.2 The model
I model a decision maker who has two modes of reasoning: System 1 and System
2 mode. System 2 is conscious, verbal, and rule-guided. System 1 is automatic,
non-verbal, and associative. System 1 processes can be described as `pre-reasoning'
or `codiﬁcation' by which System 1 impressions are `codiﬁed' as System 2. In the
spirit of Broome, I do not try to represent `pre-reasoning' but to distinguish between
`pre-reasoning', which is non-propositional, and `reasoning', which is propositional.
2.2.1 Deﬁnitions
Consider a non-empty set L of propositions and a non-empty ﬁnite set A of types of
attitude such as a preference, a belief, or an intention. Let X be a ﬁxed non-empty
set of mutually exclusive choice options, e.g. goods or political candidates or career
plans. Certain options from X are feasible; they form the feasible set, formally a
non-empty subset Y ⊆ X from which the agent chooses one element. Set L = X ∪
2X \ {∅} contains all relevant propositions for choice. The decision maker is related
to propositions through diﬀerent attitudes. She has certain preferences between
options from X and beliefs that certain options from X are feasible. I assume that
the decision maker can only form simple attitudes. Weak preferences are composite
attitudes; the weak preference x is weakly preferred to y is the disjunction of two
attitudes; x is strictly preferred to y or x is indiﬀerent to y. The ﬁrst is a
strict preference and the second is an indiﬀerence. Her reasoning results in certain
choices. Choices are not types of attitudes. Choices are the output of some thinking.
Intentions describe thinking prior to any choice. In conventional choice theory,
preference is the only type of psychological attitude which is modelled. Preferences
are revealed in choices as intentions are absent. Moreover, feasibility beliefs are
absent from standard behavioural models, because of the background assumption
that the feasible set is automatically known. I choose to describe explicitly the
agent's psychology and enrich this framework with beliefs and intentions. The set A
= {,∼, bel, int} contains all relevant types of attitude for choice. Strict preferences
and indiﬀerence attitudes are denoted  and ∼ respectively, intentions are denoted
int and feasibility beliefs are denoted bel.
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A propositional attitude, more simply, an attitude or a mental state
is an attitude type a in A towards some propositions p1, p2, ..., pk in L, a tuple
(p1, p2, ..., pk, a). Every attitude type a in A comes with k number of places of a
and a non-empty domain Da ⊆ L of propositions. The number of places and the
domain tell us that the type of attitude applies to combinations p1, p2, ..., pk of k
propositions that belong to Da. For example, attitude (x, y,) is a preference that
applies to pairs of propositions that belong to the domain of preferences D = X.
Denote byM the set of all attitudes. The pair (L,A) denotes a mental structure.
An agent holds in her mind a subset C ⊆M of attitudes I call her mental consti-
tution. The constitution forms an explicit representation of the agent's psychology
at a single point in time. I write C = 2M to denote the set of all constitutions.
System 1 which processes experiences and feelings is the main source of the
System 2 initial attitudes which together form the initial constitution C0, the inputs
of System 2. I write M0 ⊆ M to denote the set of all System 1 attitudes. I
write C0 = 2M0 to denote the set of constitutions made out of attitudes in M0.
These are attitudes that can originate in System 1 impressions and perceptions.
System 2 can `codify' them as attitudes. Set M0 ⊆ M contains all impressions
and perceptions which can be codiﬁed as attitudes. For example, the perception
of sunshine (System 1) is codiﬁed as the belief that it is sunny (System 2). Other
examples of `codiﬁcation' or `pre-reasoning' include the formation of habits which
can be codiﬁed as the intention to repeat past behaviour, or the use of analogies
which can be codiﬁed as the beliefs that one decision situation is the same as another
one.
System 2 can change the initial constitution C0 through rules that create new
attitudes such as new preferences, beliefs, and intentions from the existing ones in
C0. Formally, a rule is an ordered pair (M,m) where M is the set of premise
attitudes and m is the conclusion attitude which is deduced from M . The agent can
revise a constitution C through applying rules from S to C. The revision of C
through a rule s = (M,m), denoted C | s, is given by: either C | s = C ∪ {m} if
M ⊆ C or C | s = C if M 6⊆ C. Informally, a rule applies to add a new attitude to
a constitution. Such rules are restrictive in two ways. First, they create rather than
remove attitudes; for instance, no rule removes the preference (x, y,) based on the
premise (y, x,). Second, premises of rules are attitudes rather than absences of
attitudes; for instance, no rule forms a preference based on the absence of other
preferences. Just as requirements, rules typically come in schemas. So, one might
alternatively deﬁne a rule as a schema (set) of pairs (M,m), where these pairs are
the instances of the rule. I adopt the current more convenient terminology in which
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schemas of rules become rules and rules become instances of rules.
I represent the System 2 mode of reasoning by a set S of rules (M,m). Any set
S of rules is called a System 2, interpreted as a theoretically possible speciﬁcation
of System 2 reasoning. If nothing can be added to C by applying rules from the set
S, then a constitution C is closed under S. That is, C is closed under S if for all
s in S, C|s = C. I call the so-reached new constitution the closure of C through S.
So the closure of C through S is the constitution C|S obtained from C by applying
rules from S until the constitution reached cannot be changed by any of these rules.
Formally, C|S is the minimal extension of C closed under S. I oﬀer a more complete
deﬁnition of C|S in a separate appendix.
The decision maker enters the System 1 or the System 2 mode of reasoning at a
time as many times as she wants to achieve any of the theory's requirements. Any
requirement is written as a set of constitutions R ⊆ C. A theory of rationality
requirements is a requirement, denoted T ⊆ C.
What is a `good' System 2, given a theory of rationality? I postulate two desirable
conditions.
1. Desirable condition 1 : System 2 should achieve that requirement.
2. Desirable condition 2 : In so doing, System 2 should preserve consistency by
not creating inconsistencies in the theory.
The following deﬁnitions make the two conditions precise:
Deﬁnition 2.1. A System 2 achieves a requirement R if for each constitution C,
its revision C | S satisﬁes R.
The next two deﬁnitions clarify the Desirable condition 2:
Deﬁnition 2.2. Given a theory T , a constitution C is consistent if its attitudes
can be rationally held together, i.e. if some constitution C ′ ∈ T includes C.
How does consistency of a constitution relate to the notion of consistency re-
quirements from Chapter 1? In Dietrich et al. (2018) we show that a constitution
is consistent if and only if it satisﬁes all consistency requirements of the theory.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Given a theory T , a System 2 preserves consistency if for every
consistent constitution C, the revised constitution C | S is still consistent.
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2.2.2 Examples
In Chapter 1, I describe formal rationality like rational choice in terms of rationality
requirements. Then I set out an account of rational choice that consists of eight
schemas of requirements. Let T be a set of constitutions which are deemed rational
by the eight schemas of requirements. Consider a set of arbitrary rules S and a
constitution C that satisﬁes schemas of requirements R2 asymmetry of , R3 in-
compatibility of  and ∼, R4 symmetry of ∼, and also R6 non-conﬂicting feasibility
beliefs and R7 non-conﬂicting intentions. This section provides examples that show
how the model of reasoning applies with respect to the rest of the requirements of
T .
Example 1
R1 Transitivity of weak preferences: For any x, y, z ∈ X,
if (x, y,) ∈ C or (x, y,∼) ∈ C and (y, z,) ∈ C or (y, z,∼) ∈ C, then
(x, z,) ∈ C or (x, z,∼) ∈ C.
Conditional on asymmetry of , symmetry of ∼, and incompatibility between 
and ∼, this schema of requirement is equivalent to four subschemas of requirements:
strict preference transitivity, indiﬀerence transitivity, PI transitivity, and IP trans-
itivity, all of which have a structure analogous to that of if... then... rules in S.
So, I can construct a System 2 that contains one rule to achieve each of these re-
quirements. This demonstrates a fundamental truth about explicit reasoning which
is a process by which the presence of certain attitudes causes the presence of an-
other attitude. A process like this is well adapted to achieve requirements whose
antecedent and consequent are that certain attitudes are present.
Unlike this example which shows that it is possible that a System 2 could achieve
certain requirements of T , the following three examples show limitations of System
2 to achieve certain other requirements of T .
Example 2
R5 Completeness of weak preferences: For any x, y ∈ X,
either (x, y,) ∈ C or (y, x,) ∈ C or (x, y,∼) ∈ C.
This schema of requirements requires that a preference or indiﬀerence between x
and y exists. There is an easy way to achieve R5: ﬁx an attitude and adopt the
rule `always form this attitude with an empty premise set'. There are three rules of
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reasoning that can achieve completeness from the empty set: (i) s = (∅, (x, y,)),
(ii) s′ = (∅, (y, x,)), and (iii) s′′ = (∅, (x, y,∼)). There are two problems with this.
First, from a psychological point of view, such arbitrary rules seem unjustiﬁed
for System 2. System 2 operates on inputs generated by System 1 to form explicit
attitudes such as any speciﬁc preference or indiﬀerence between options x and y.
If, given the preferences and beliefs you actually hold, there is no way of reasoning
towards any speciﬁc preference or indiﬀerence between options x and y, one might
doubt that you are justiﬁed to hold some preference or indiﬀerence, while being
silent about which. That is, if inputs are insuﬃcient to allow conscious System 2
reasoning to arrive at particular types of conclusion, this limitation does not seem
to be a fault of reasoning. As Gilboa et al. (2012) and Infante et al. (2016) have
also argued, there can be cases in which it is not possible or desirable to compare
propositions from X.
Second, from a theoretical point of view, designing such arbitrary rules that can
achieve a completeness requirement often causes inconsistencies in the theory. Sup-
pose you initially have no preference or indiﬀerence between x and y, violating R5,
but you prefer y to another option z, and z to x. So your initial constitution is C0 =
{(y, z,), (z, x,), ...}, where `...' stands for other attitudes. Let System 2 contain
the rule s, so that the revised constitution is C|S = {(x, y,), (y, z,), (z, x,), ...}.
While C|S satisﬁes R5, it violates a preference-acyclicity requirement. Complete-
ness of preferences has been achieved at the cost of creating inconsistencies in the
theory.
The conclusion is that, by setting up the theory in terms of requirements alone,
one does not deal with choice as the output of a process of reasoning. If, however,
choice is viewed as the output of a process of reasoning, transitivity appears to be
rational in a way that completeness does not. In the course of achieving transitivity,
you create a new preference you did not originally have, given your other preferences.
The way you achieve transitivity may actually be viewed as a process that helps you
to ﬁnd reasons to infer certain preference from others. If you prefer x to y, and
you prefer y to z, then these two preferences give you a reason to prefer x to z. By
contrast, completeness provides no help in ﬁnding reasons to rank elements of X,
say x over y. Gilboa et al. (2012) make a similar point: they call the transitivity
axiom a reasoning axiom and conclude that choice that is the output of a process
of reasoning need not be complete.
Example 3
R1+ Negative Transitivity: For any x, y, z ∈ X,
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if (y, x,) /∈ C and (z, y,) /∈ C, then (z, x,) /∈ C.
Unlike transitivity which is formulated on preferences, this is a schema of require-
ments which is formulated on non-preferences. It is questionable whether you can
conclude anything from the absence of certain preferences and particularly the ab-
sence of a speciﬁc preference. So from a psychological point of view, transitivity
appears to be rational in a way that negative transitivity is not. Moreover, given
the resources of my model, we simply cannot design a rule that concludes in the ab-
sence of an attitude. But we can construct a rule that concludes in the presence of
a strict preference from the the presence of other strict preferences. Negative trans-
itivity in contrapositive form tells us that for all options x, y, z ∈ X, if (z, x,) ∈ C
then for any y, either (z, y,) ∈ C or (y, x,) ∈ C. So we can ﬁnd two rules
that achieve negative transitivity: they are (i) s = ({(z, x,)}, (y, x,)) and (ii)
s′ = ({(z, x,)}, (z, y,)). But such rules are arbitrary and unjustiﬁed.
Suppose you initially prefer z to x and x to y and prefer neither y to x nor z to y
violating negative transitivity. So your initial constitution C0 = {(z, x,), (x, y,
), ...}, where `...' stands for other attitudes, is consistent. Suppose that System 2
contains rule s. The revised constitution is C|S = {(z, x,), (x, y,), (y, x,), ...}.
While C|S satisﬁes negative transitivity, it violates asymmetry of . Negative
transitivity has been achieved at the cost of creating inconsistencies in the theory.
A diﬀerent approach is to assume that non-preferences suggest a particular inter-
pretation of weak preferences as the complement of strict preferences. Given com-
pleteness, strict preferences are the only primitive attitudes and weak preferences
are derived from the absence of strict preferences. In this case, negative transit-
ivity of strict preferences can be reduced, given completeness of weak preferences,
to (positive) transitivity of weak preferences. Note that this interpretation of weak
preferences diﬀers from the interpretation of weak preferences as a disjunction of
weak preference and indiﬀerence attitudes. Moreover, it requires completeness that
can be achieved but usually only though arbitrary rules.
Example 4
R8 Economic Enkrasia: This schema of requirements links intention to pref-
erence. For any feasible set Y ⊆ X and Z ⊆ Y such that Z 6= ∅,
1. if (Y, bel) ∈ C and (x, y,) ∈ C for all x ∈ Z, y ∈ Y \ Z
2. and (x, z,∼) ∈ C for all distinct x, z,∈ Z,
3. then (x, int) ∈ C for some x ∈ Z.
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This requirement reﬂects the classical preference-maximisation hypothesis resulting
in intentions rather than choices. There are two main diﬀerences of analysing in-
tentions prior to actions rather than choice acts directly (see for example the weak
axiom of revealed preference (Samuelson, 1938)). First, although preferences range
over all options, feasible or non-feasible, intentions relate only to what you believe to
be the feasible set. Thus, there is no mental analogue to the choice-theoretic concept
of a choice function. Second, even if there is more than one top-ranked option in
your feasible set, you intend a speciﬁc one of them. By allowing the choice function
to output non-singleton sets, conventional choice theory evades the question of how
you choose between indiﬀerent options. This point can be illustrated with the classic
story of Buridan's ass.
In the story, the ass is exactly equidistant from two identical bales of hay, one to
its right and one to its left. Let the ass face the feasible set Y = {l, r, s}, and have
the initial constitution C = {(Y, bel), (l, r,∼), (l, s,), (r, s,)} where l, r, and s is
`left', `right', and `starve' respectively. Intuitively, the ass choosing to apply either
of the rules s = (C, (l, int)) or s′ = (C, (r, int)) gets to a bale of hay and survives.
According to rational choice choosing either bale of hay when the ass could have
chosen the other appears as if one bale of hay was no worse than the other.
The traditional interpretation of the story is that the ass was indiﬀerent between
the two bales of hay. Unable to decide between the two, it fails to form an intention
for left or right and starves to death. Viewed through the model, the ass also fails
to achieve economic enkrasia. If the ass applies either (or both) of the rules s and
s′, the ass can form an intention to go to one bale of hay, thereby achieving the
economic enkrasia requirement. But this leads to conﬂicting intentions whenever
(against the story) another intention was already present. So while C|S satisﬁes
R8, it violates non-contradiction of intentions. By explicitly modelling rules that
conclude in single attitudes rather than choice functions that output non-singleton
sets, I point out a gap in the theory that does not tell us how you choose between
indiﬀerent options.
The second, less popular, interpretation of the story is that the ass did not have
any preferences or indiﬀerences over the two bales of hay (Sen, 1973). On this
interpretation, the ass has failed to achieve completeness of preferences which I have
discussed in example 2.
2.2.3 Possible solutions
I tried in the above examples to explore some of the possibilities and limitations of
System 2 reasoning, given that System 2 is understood as a set of rules. Now I will
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consider diﬀerent ways in which the automatic processes of System 1 might help to
solve these problems. For example, the automatic processes of System 1 might (i)
cut in to economise the cognitive costs of ranking elements of X or (ii) activate a
stopping rule to eliminate the surplus intentions.
Here is one possibility: the decision maker is assumed to be able to construct
context-independent preferences between any relevant pair of options using System
2, but doing so is cognitively costly (e.g. a limited number of elements from X can
be evaluated). To economise on these costs, she uses a System 1 heuristic which
makes preferences over a shortlist of feasible options easy to retrieve. In terms of
the model, the initial set of attitudes C0 is the outcome of a System 1 heuristic
which reduces the complexity of the decision process. Then System 2 maximises
a preference relation on a subset X ′ ⊆ X of choiceworthy options, i.e. L′ ⊆ L
where L′ = X ′ ∪ 2X′ \{∅}. Manzini and Mariotti (2012) propose a Categorise then
choose model in which options are subdivided into categories (e.g. if the set of
options X is all cereals in the supermarket, one category would be based on sugar
concentration). The decision maker `simpliﬁes' the problem by eliminating some
subsets of the feasible set of options X that belong in least-preferred categories (e.g.
sugar-free cereals dominate cereals with sugar). Then he picks the maximal element
according to his preference among the surviving alternatives.
In a related model Dietrich and List (2016) assume that each option is described
by the agent as a bundle of `motivationally salient properties'. The agent maximises
preferences over such property bundles. Although these preferences are context-
independent, choice reversals happen because the context inﬂuences which properties
are motivationally salient and hence how options are perceived.
An alternative approach is to model choice as the outcome of some mental pro-
cess that does not (or does not need to) include the concept of preference. The agent
might lack any preference or indiﬀerence between the options in question, a possibil-
ity defended informally by Infante et al. (2016). The automatic processes of System
1 then step in and lead to intentions towards propositions from X without these
intentions being the result of some preference-maximization procedure. In terms of
the model, the initial set of attitudes C0 is the outcome of some automatic process
which results directly in intentions with no prior preferences linked to them. Si-
mon's model of satisﬁcing (1955) oﬀers one such alternative. The agent processes
decisions sequentially, and stops when an option is above some ﬁxed reservation
level. In example 4 the process stops when one of the attitudes (l, int) or (r, int) is
reached, eliminating the surplus intention.
Another alternative is oﬀered by models that introduce some sort of System
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1 thinking by analogies. Cerigioni (2017) presents a model that formalises the
activation of automatic choices as the result of non-deliberative processes driven by
(analogies with) past experiences. The paper focuses on priming, replicating past
behaviour in familiar choice environment, as the main source of automatic choice.
Choice is the result of a conscious process if the alternative chosen maximises a
preference relation onX otherwise choice is the result of an automatic process that
replicates past behaviour. In the language of the dual-system hypothesis, System 1
uses analogies to deal with the choice environment, and System 2 uses a preference
relation to choose the top option among the available. Gilboa and Wang (2018)
present a dual system model where the automatic processes of following habits and
sticking with status quo decisions belong to System 1 and the conscious decision
making processes belong to System 2. The model formalises a decision maker who
sometimes is better oﬀ retaining the status quo rather than making conscious choice.
This model shares similarities with Cerigioni's model in that the status quo can be
viewed as making the same choice that has been made in similar cases in the past
and is not the result of preference maximisation.
2.2.4 Philosophical and cognitive foundations of System 2
This section shows how John Broome's rigorous analysis of reasoning which has been
the main theme of his book Rationality through Reasoning (2013) can be mapped
into the model, and discusses some ﬁndings in cognitive sciences in support of it.
Referring to the process of reasoning, Broome says,
Some requirements are too diﬃcult for our automatic processes to cope
with [...] when automatic processes let us down, our mortal rational dis-
position equips us with a further, self-help mechanism. We have another
way of improving our score by our own eﬀorts. We can do it through the
mental activity of reasoning (2013, p. 207)
What, according to Broome, distinguishes the mental process of reasoning from the
subconscious and automatic mental processes is that it is:
1. Plausibly explicit.
2. Rule-governed.
3. A conscious act.
The ﬁrst characteristic is that active reasoning is plausibly explicit. Explicit reason-
ing means that you express the content of the attitude to yourself using a sentence.
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For example, saying to yourself `It is raining' is normally the way in which you
express your belief that it is raining in language. The pair consisting of the atti-
tude and the attitude's content is a marked content. Saying to yourself the marked
contents of attitudes explains how you acquire a new attitude you initially did not
have from existing attitudes. It is crucial in this account that not all the reasoning
you can do is reasoning with beliefs  that not all attitudes are reducible to be-
lief attitudes. For example, rational choice, as a theory of practical rationality, is
primarily concerned with attitudes other than beliefs and sometimes with beliefs. So
an agent's reasoning can go as follows: `getting x and getting y are the only feasible
options', `Rather I get x than I get y', So, `I shall get x'. This links preferences,
as the natural primitive input of the theory, and intention to choose, as the ﬁnal
output of those preferences. Section 2.1 proposes a simple way to describe these
mental states as particular tuples of types of attitudes and their contents.
The second characteristic is that in reasoning you are guided by a rule. Broome
considers the following example of reasoning to illustrate the sense in which you are
guided by a rule: Imagine that you wake up one morning and hear dripping water.
You come to believe that it is raining.2 You recall that last night it was snowing.
You combine this with the knowledge that if it is raining the snow will melt and
conclude that the snow will melt (2013, pp. 216, 223). In this example, you initially
believe two propositions: `It is raining' and `If it is raining the snow will melt', and
the come to believe that `the snow will melt'. A rule, modus ponens, allows you to
create a new belief you initially did not have from the existing beliefs, saying to your
self `So the snow will melt'. If reasoning is purely causal then you do not follow a
rule; the rule causes something to you. So, what takes place in your mind is your
following a rule. You follow a particular rule because it seems right to you; whether
you follow correctly the rule or not; and whether the rule is correct or not. I have
described these processes as ordered pairs that consist of a set of premise attitudes
and the conclusion attitude.
The third characteristic, that reasoning is a conscious act, follows from the previ-
ous two. It is conscious because you are conscious of the content of the attitude you
reason with. The contents you reason with are usually not about your attitudes. So
it is a mental operation with and not about attitudes. In the rain example, you are
conscious of the content of your belief attitudes. Moreover, this is an act because
reasoning is something you do rather than something that happens to you. You
acquire a belief you initially did not have (e.g. that the snow will melt) following
2This is an example of codiﬁcation I have discussed earlier. The perception of hearing water
dripping is codiﬁed as the belief that it is raining.
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rules of reasoning.
Consider the following example: Imagine that you see a spider. You come to
believe that there is spider in the room. Suppose you are in Australia where spiders
are dangerous and that you want to stay safe. You combine your knowledge with
your belief that there is spider in the room and conclude that you shall leave the
room. Because reasoning allows you to `codify' or `organise' your perceptions and
feelings as attitudes you might be able to describe your process that lead to your
leaving the room as a process that looks like conscious reasoning: `there is a spider
in the room', `spiders are dangerous', `I would like to be safe', `So, I shall leave the
room'. So many philosophers believe that automatic and subconscious processes
involve propositions. See Sugden (2006) for a critical approach to this view.
But suppose that it was not the belief that there is a spider combined with
your knowledge that spiders are dangerous and your desire to stay safe that caused
the intention but a diﬀerent mental process. One possibility is that it was fear
that caused you to leave  that it was not your reasoning. This causal process is
automatic and subconscious. It is a process that is not reasoning. Fear causes you
to leave without thinking. Upon fear, you act and do not intend. Intending to leave
is not leaving the room. Reasoning is something you do rather than something that
happens to you. Codifying and organising our perceptions in terms of beliefs and
intentions in the spider example is one of many ways we have to explain to ourselves
what caused a particular behaviour. It is a property of our language that these
subconscious processes can be redescribed in terms of propositional attitudes as if
we were reasoning with them. But this might not be the process in itself  e.g. the
process that caused you to leave the room.3
Experimental studies in self-justiﬁcation (for example, Nisbett and Wilson 1977
and Wilson and Bar-Anan 2008) suggest that people who have previously observed
their own behaviour are good at coming up with reasons that can justify their
behaviour to themselves, but relatively poor at ﬁnding the actual mental process
that led to this behaviour. In the spider example, the rationalisation that you acted
on the belief that spiders are dangerous is false. Your ` feeling fear' is an empirically
accurate description of your state of mind. So if we were to redescribe this state of
mind with marked contents, the pair (spider, fear) would be an empirically accurate
description of the state of mind you were in.
For Broome, the three characteristics I have described above capture the intuitive
notion of everyday human reasoning which is a conscious act conducted in a language
3In Broome's terminology, these automatic processes are treated in the jogging account of
reasoning (2013, pp. 225-227).
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through which you give rise to new attitudes from existing ones following a reasoning
rule. So Broome's account, naturally, explores the relations of consequence that hold
between attitudes and not between propositions or sentences as it is usually the case
in classical and modal logics (2013, p. 254). Language is usually the means you have
to express an attitude of yours by bringing in your mind the proposition together
with its type of attitude. If reasoning is conducted in a language, then according to
Broome,
we can only reason about marked contents if we have markers in our
language to designate them [and] [t]his means that the reasoning we can
do is limited by the contingencies of our language(Broome, 2010, p. 76)
For example, by saying `I do not prefer the fruit to the cake' you do not express a
non-preference as there is no English markers to express non-preferences but there
are markeres to express beliefs, in particular the belief in the absence of a preference.
Negative attitudes such as nonbeliefs or nonpreferences and disbeliefs or disprefer-
ences have no role in explicit reasoning as language has no way of expressing them.
In reasoning explicitly with your attitudes you cannot conclude the absence of an
attitude (2013, p. 278).
I am aware of no formal model (of reasoning) that explores this possibility as
limitations of a System 2. The following section explores one way. I prove ﬁve
theorems that show how far a decision maker can go when reasoning explicitly with
her attitudes to achieve rationality requirements. Although I am primarily interested
in rational choice requirements these results apply to requirements in general.
2.3 A characterisation of System 2
While Section 2.3 presents some of the limitations of System 2 to achieve rational
choice requirements, Section 3 shows what requirements, in general, System 2 can
or cannot achieve. I am ﬁrst going to need a language for requirements that roughly
matches the language in which the reasoning rules are described. Most requirements
can be written in some `If . . . then ...' form. So I can roughly match requirements
with reasoning rules. In chapter 1 I have identiﬁed ﬁve requirement types that have
this form. I brieﬂy restate them:
1. A requirement R is a completeness requirement if it is of the form `if absence
of all elements of M \ {m} then presence of m' with respect to a set of mental
states M ⊆M with M 6=∅ and m ∈M .
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2. A requirement R is a consistency requirement if it is of the form `if presence
of all elements of M \ {m} then absence of m' with respect to a set of mental
states M ⊆M with M 6=∅ and m ∈M .
3. A requirement R is a closedness requirement if it is of the form `if presence of
all elements of M then presence of m' with respect to a set of mental states
M ⊂M with M 6=∅ and a mental state m ∈M with m/∈M .
4. A requirement R is a negative closedness requirement if it is of the form `if
absence of all elements of M then absence of m' (equivalently, `if presence of
m then presence of at least one element of M ') with respect to a set of mental
states M ⊂M with M 6=∅ and a mental state m ∈M with m/∈M .
5. A requirement R is a conditional completeness requirement if it is of the form
`if presence of all elements of M then presence of at least one element of N '
with respect to a pair of sets of mental states M,N ⊆ M with M ∩ N = ∅
and M,N 6= ∅; formally: M ⊆ C ⇒ N ∩ C 6= ∅.
The words if ... then ... and at least one in the brackets all belong in the
language in which the requirement is described, and not the language in which you
are thinking and making choices.4
Notice two things: First, completeness, consistency, closedness, and negative
closedness do not overlap except for the special case that negative closedness is with
respect to some singleton set M = {m′}, in which case negative closedness and
closedeness overlap. Conditional completeness does not overlap with any other re-
quirement type given that it is deﬁned with respect to pairs of distinct non-singleton
sets M,N . Second, given the ﬁrst observation, each requirement from R1 to R8 has
a single corresponding type of requirement. I can now address my central question:
Can System 2 achieve full rationality? How far can one become rational
with System 2? Five theorems show the (im)possibility to achieve particular
types of rationality requirements whilst preserving consistency. They roughly state
the following:
1. System 2 can achieve Closedness requirements while also preserving consist-
ency.
2. System 2 cannot achieve Consistency requirements.
4It is common to formally represent theories of rationality as propositions in some language.
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3. System 2 can achieve (a) Completeness, or (b) Negative Closedness, or (c)
Conditional Completeness requirements, but usually only at the cost of creat-
ing inconsistencies.
2.3.1 Can System 2 achieve closedeness requirements?
Theorem 2.1. Given any theory T , there is a system 2 which achieves each closed-
ness requirement of T and preserves consistency.
This theorem formalises the fundamental truth that explicit reasoning is well
adapted to achieving closedness requirements. The proof establishes this by con-
structing a System 2 that contains one rule for each closedness requirement of T .
As a result of this, each closedness requirement of T is achieved in a single reasoning
step. So S may contain a huge number of rules. But not all closedness requirements
need have a tailor-made rule in S. Often there exists a much smaller S which still
achieves every closedness requirements (and preserves consistency) in more than one
reasoning step.
2.3.2 Can System 2 achieve consistency requirements?
Theorem 2.2. No system 2 achieves any consistency requirement.
This theorem formalises the idea that in explicit reasoning you cannot conclude
the absence of an attitude  that you can only add but cannot remove attitudes.
Non-contradiction of preferences for example, concludes the absence of the preference
for x over y given your existing preference for y over x.
2.3.3 Can System 2 achieve completeness requirements?
This theorem will draw on the following notion:
Deﬁnition 2.4. Given a theory T , an attitude m is falsiﬁable if some consistent
constitution C becomes inconsistent after adding m.
In plausible theories of rationality, almost all attitudes are falsiﬁable. The atti-
tude (x, y,) in Example 2 is falsiﬁable because it rules out (y, x,) and (x, y,∼),
and the combination of (y, z,) and (z, x,).
Theorem 2.3. Given any theory T 6= ∅,
1. some system 2 achieves all completeness requirements of T , but
2. no system 2 that preserves consistency achieves any completeness requirement
of T that is given by a set M whose members are falsiﬁable.
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2.3.4 Can System 2 achieve negative closedness requirements?
As one can check the negative closedness requirements which are deﬁned with respect
to a singletonM and attitude m are logically equivalent to closedeness requirements
with respect to a singletonM and attitudem. So a system 2 can achieve some special
cases of negative closedness requirements of T .
The following theorem about negative closedness is restricted to cases where M
is not a singleton (e.g. negative transitivity). This theorem will draw on the notion
of conditional falsiﬁability:
Deﬁnition 2.5. Given any theory of rationality T and any setM ⊆ N of attitudes,
an attitude m ∈ N \M is falsiﬁable given M if some consistent constitution that
includes M becomes inconsistent through adding m.
For negative closedness, an attitude m ∈ N \M is falsiﬁable given a singleton
{m′}. The attitude (y, x,) in Example 3 is falsiﬁable given singleton {(z, x,)}
because it rules out (x, y,).
Theorem 2.4. Given any theory T ,
1. some system 2 achieves all negative closedness requirements of T , but
2. no system 2 that preserves consistency achieves any negative closedness re-
quirement whose each attitude in M is falsiﬁable given {m′}.
2.3.5 Can System 2 achieve conditional completeness require-
ments?
This theorem will also draw on the notion of conditional falsiﬁability. For condi-
tional completeness, an attitude m ∈ N \M is falsiﬁable given set M . The attitude
(l, int) in Example 4 is falsiﬁable given C because it rules out (r, int).
The notion of falsiﬁability or conditional falsiﬁability arises when a requirement
contains disjuncts. Completeness, negative closedness, and conditional completeness
are the only types of requirement that can contain disjuncts. Examples 2, 3, and 4
are examples of the above types of requirement that contain disjuncts. Completeness
of preferences requires that at least one of the three disjuncts (x, y,), (y, x,)
and (x, y,∼) is in the constitution. Negative transitivity requires that at least
one of the two disjuncts (y, x,) and (z, y,) is in the constitution. Economic
enkrasia requires that at least one of the two disjuncts (x, int) and (z, int) is in the
constitution.
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In each of these cases, falsiﬁability or conditional falsiﬁability arises because each
disjunction has two disjuncts, and there is a rule for each disjunct. In example 2,
any one of the rules s = (∅, (x, y,)), or s′ = (∅, (y, x,)), or s′′ = (∅, (x, y,∼)) can
achieve completeness of weak preferences, a completeness requirement. In example
3, either of the rules s = ({(z, x,)}, (y, x,)), or s′ = ({(z, x,)}, (z, y,)) can
achieve negative transitivity, a negative closedness requirement. And in example 4
either of the rules s = (C, (l, int)), or s′ = (C, (r, int)) can achieve economic enkrasia
which is a conditional completeness requirement. So it is possible to achieve either
completeness, or negative closedness, or conditional completeness by applying at
least one of these rules from S. But because it is possible to achieve these types of
requirement by applying many of these rules, doing so can result in the conclusion
of a certain attitude m that is (conditionally) falsiﬁable.
The next theorem formalises the idea that reasoning explicitly towards an either...
or... conclusion can result in a certain attitude m that is (conditionally) falsiﬁable.
So Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 are special cases of this theorem. It would be convenient for
the proof of this theorem to consider a single type of requirement that generalises
completeness, negative closedness, and conditional completeness types of require-
ment. This requirement can be written as a conditional-completeness-like type of
requirement. I call this type of requirement a conditional completeness* require-
ment. Formally, a requirement R is a conditional completeness* requirement if
there is a pair of sets of mental states M,N ⊆M with M ∩N = ∅ and N 6= ∅ such
that if M ⊆ C then ∃m ∈ N : m ∈ C.5
Theorem 2.5. Given any theory T ,
1. some system 2 achieves all conditional completeness* requirements of T , but
2. no system 2 that preserves consistency achieves any conditional completeness*
requirement whose attitudes in N are all falsiﬁable given M .
The negative ﬁndings in part (2) of the theorems concern the notions of (condi-
tional) faliﬁability. Note the special cases of completeness with respect to a singleton
M = {m}, and conditional completeness (negative closedness) with respect to
singleton sets M = {m}, N = {m′} (singleton set M = {m′}). For complete-
ness, the attitude m is by deﬁnition non-falsiﬁable because any plausible theory of
rationality that is consistent would already contain m. For conditional completeness
(negative closedness), attitude m′ given attitude m in M (attitude m given attitude
5In fact, Chapter 1 identiﬁes a single type of requirement that uniﬁes all types of requirement
considered above, the uniﬁed requirement. The uniﬁed requirement is written as a conditional-
completeness-like type of requirement imposing M ∪N 6= ∅ rather than N 6= ∅.
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m′ in M) is by deﬁnition non-falsiﬁable because any plausible theory of rationality
that is consistent would already contain m′ given M .
Summing up, Theorems 2-5 show that there are formal limitations of a System
2 to achieve certain types of requirement. The limitations are related solely to the
formal structure of requirements and reasoning and not to any account of what
qualiﬁes as correct reasoning. This conclusion however hinges on accepting the rule-
following and language-based account of System 2 I have oﬀered, which assumes
that you cannot start from the absence of an attitude, a thesis that Kolodny agrees
with (2005, pp. 527-8), or conclude in the absence of an attitude, a thesis that
Broome agrees with (2013, p. 278).
2.4 Discussion
This section relates the formal analysis to existing `System 1/ System 2' models in
cognitive sciences and behavioural economics, particularly the dual self model. Since
Wason and Evans 1974 and Kahneman 2003b, 2003a, and 2011, a growing number
of behavioural economic models have incorporated the dual-system hypothesis to
distinguish the choice which is prone to contextual cues and is made by the fast
System 1 from the choice which is not aﬀected by environmental cues and is made
by the slow System 2. Neuroeconomically inspired models have gone as far as to use
the dual-system hypothesis as a useful analogy to describe the neurophysiology of
the brain. My intention is to identify the main modelling approaches that adopt the
dual-system hypothesis in relation to the thesis's main question, and not to write a
comprehensive literature review.
I explore how these three approaches answer my question with the means of
an example. There are two options x and y that can be faced in two alternative
contexts, K and K ′. I focus on contexts that have been the subject of experimental
studies of dynamic choice that have inspired dual process economic models of choice.
A typical dynamic choice experiment, an experiment that studies decision-making
over time, involves choices between outcomes at diﬀerent points in time; for example,
the choice between a monetary prize p today and a bigger monetary prize q at a
later point in time made today and the same choice made at an earlier point in time,
or the choice between a fruit and a cake for dinner dessert made in the morning and
the same choice made at the dinner time. In relation to my choice example above,
the two options x and y that can be faced are the fruit and the cake or prize p and
prize q, and the two alternative contexts, K and K ′, is the the time in which the
choice is made.
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Dynamically consistent rational choice requires that choices planned for a given
future point in time do not diﬀer from the actual choices made at that time. If
(fruit, this afternoon) trumps (cake, this afternoon) when the options are compared
in the morning, then (fruit, this afternoon) trumps (cake, this afternoon) when the
options are compared in the afternoon. So for rational choice, these contexts include
information that is irrelevant for the evaluation of the two options. For all aspects
that are relevant for ranking x and y, x chosen in context K is identical to x chosen
in K ′, and the same is true for y.
However, we observe that the agent chooses x in K and y in K ′. Experiments
will typically show that, contrary to what this principle requires, people do not
make stable choices; they do not stick to their plans (see for example, Ainslie 1992,
Horowitz 1991, Loewenstein 1988, and Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). They will
plan to have the fruit but will order the cake at dinner; or they will prefer to get
the smaller prize on 1 September rather than get the bigger prize on 8 September
if they compare the options on 1 September, but will prefer to get the bigger prize
on 8 September if they compare the options on 1 August. In short, people have
diﬀerent attitudes towards short-run and long-run payments; they will be more
sensitive towards the time of payment when payments are in the present or near
future, and will become more sensitive towards the size of the gain when payments
are in the more distant future. And they will focus on diﬀerent attributes (calories,
sugar, price) depending on how far ahead the time of choice is; so, they will have
diﬀerent attitudes towards short-run and long-run options. So it is uncontroversial
that such patterns of behaviour violate the rationality requirements imposed by
standard choice theory. But is this evidence of failure of System 2 or System 1?
I investigate three possible approaches to answering this question that all, in
one way or another, incorporate some sort of dual-process model of reasoning for
choice. The ﬁrst two modelling approaches are known in the economics literature
as dual self models and have been (naturally) used to study time preferences and
as the example above. To explain deviations from economic theory, these models
have enriched the conventional model of choice with additional information regard-
ing the frame or the context in which choice is made, and have assigned one self the
ability to make decisions like an economist and made the other self or selves prone
to contextual cues. The idea of a model in which two or more selves interact with
each other dates back at least to Strotz (1955). Strotz's model explored how an
agent who experiences changes in preferences during a course of action would max-
imise expected utility. To answer this question, Strotz, introduces diﬀerent levels of
sophistication breaking down the maximisation problem to smaller ones each cor-
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responding to one self. There are two types of Strotzian models: one that assumes
that selves are cooperative and the other that they are conﬂicting.
2.4.1 The cooperative selves approach
McClennen (1990) was one of the ﬁrst to oﬀer a cooperative selves model. There is
a single continuing or atemporal self who lives and makes a sequence of decisions at
diﬀerent points in time. Temporal selves live at diﬀerent points in time and have
their own goals and desires. The continuing self does what is best for her devising
a plan of action. Each of these temporal selves anticipates what the next self wants
and knows what the continuing self also wants. She will do what is best for all selves
provided that the other self will do what is best for all selves. So each temporal self
can contribute to the resolution of the plan minimising the cost of deviating from it.
In this framework, being resolute is a form of being rational. Formally the decision
maker, the continuing self, plays a coordination game working backwards through
each period. Temporal selves contribute to the execution of the plan assuming
perfect knowledge.
In relation to my example above, the agent is assumed to have and is always
conscious of a context-independent preference in favour of one of the options, say
x. Knowing that in context K ′ and not in K, as it is the case of the examples
above, there are psychological `cues' that activate a temptation to take y instead of
the optimal x, the agent devises a plan of action to choose x avoiding these cues.
Preferences and choices that do not conform to the optimal plan are excluded as
non-pertinent. So on this approach, rationality will be assigned to one self, the
continuing self. Temporal selves reach a resolution employing some sort of team
reasoning which is now assumed to be some sort of System 2 thinking.
The beneﬁt this approach has is that it allows us to think of dynamic choice
without assuming the deviations from decision theory are lack of self-control. Since
there is one self capable of deciding a plan of action, not many, no conﬂicting selves
cut in to obstruct this process and the ﬁnal plan will follow a normative standard
that satisﬁes all selves involved.
2.4.2 The conﬂicting selves approach
The other approach models an agent who faces an internal tension between the
deliberative System 2 and the impulsive System 1. In context K ′ (and not in K)
the psychological `cues' will activate a temptation to take y despite preferring x.
Choice contexts in which a consumer faces a choice that involves the consumption
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of addictive substances can be modelled as self-control problems. Lack of self-control
will then naturally be seen as a failure to activate the deliberative System 2 and
constrain the impulsive System 1. In such contexts it might be useful to think of
each system as a self that has preferences and is motivated by her own interest,
and describe the reasoning process as an internal conﬂict between a far-sighted,
deliberative self and a short-sighted, impulsive self or selves.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) model a decision maker who is assigned two selves,
a `planner' and a `doer' that each has a preference relation. The `planner' has the
ability to construct rational and context-independent preferences but psychological
cues which are irrelevant to the evaluation of options in question such as which
option is designated as the default activate the `doer'. Ideally, the `planner' who is
the more rational self exercises control over the the other self. Thaler and Sunstein
use this hypothesis to motivate a behavioural analysis of welfare that promotes
public policies such as nudging that are said to help individuals avoid reasoning
errors (2008, pp. 40-1). Sunstein (2014, p. 150) writes referring to the practices of
the nudger
In all these cases, the goal is not to encourage conscious deliberation or
to activate System 2. It is to produce certain outcomes by inﬂuencing
or appealing to System 1.
In these cases, the behavioural welfare economist, knowing what your System 2
preferences and your System 1 preferences are, can design a choice context that will
activate the latter to achieve what is best for you that is, for System 2. According to
the nudger, the architect of the choice context, these decisions are in people's own
interest, and people have been informed about them before this policy takes place.
Bernheim and Rangel (2004) propose a model that describes the processes of drug
addicts. Two selves describe the interactions between a hot mode of automatic
responses to cues  the short-sighted self  and a cold mode of forward-looking
reasoning  the far-sighted self. When the decision maker enters a hot mode she
consumes addictive substances irrespective of the consequences of this choice. When
the decision maker enters a cold mode she constructs preferences considering all
possible implications of her choices, including the eﬀects of cues on entering the hot
mode in the future. Fudenberg and Levine (2006) present a game theoretic model
where a sequence of short-sighted selves interact with a far-sighted self to construct
their preferences. Fudenberg and Levine (2012); Thaler and Shefrin (1981); Brocas
and Carrillo (2008) also model one self who is capable of making far-sighted economic
decisions constraining the impulsive, short-sighted self. The setting these models
propose is basically the same: there is an individual who makes a consumption-
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Choices under Uncertainty
Gamble 1 Gamble 2 Gamble 3 Gamble 4
`certain' `likely' `unlikely' `very unlikely'
`small prize' `medium prize' `large prize' `very large prize'
Time choices
Reward 1 Reward 2 Reward 3 Reward 4
`today' `tomorrow' `in the future' `in the distant future'
`small prize' `medium prize' `large prize' `very large prize'
Table 2.1: Representation of diﬀerent choice situations, the ﬁrst from the perspective
of how risky they feel and the second from the perspective of how distant they feel.
savings decision at diﬀerent points in time. A decision is eventually made when one
self overtakes the other in some speciﬁc sense deﬁned in the model. These models
diﬀer essentially at the level of conﬂict between the two selves.
This tension between a short-run self and a long-run self has also been used to
explain people's commonly observed attitudes towards risk. For example, Fudenberg
et al. (2014) derive a simple version of their benchmark dual self model (2006)
to interpret diﬀerent attitudes towards certain and uncertain prizes as a tension
between a short-run risk-averse self and a long-run risk-neutral self. The idea is
that there is a relationship between the diﬀerent attitudes that people have towards
short-run and long-run rewards and the diﬀerent attitudes that people have towards
certain and uncertain outcomes. Table 1 shows one way in which decisions over time
are related to decisions that involve gambles. Distance in time is treated as a source
of uncertainty (i.e. the more distant the outcome is said to be, the less probable it
is that you will get it, e.g. because of death).
Psychologically, attitudes to distance in time are similar to attitudes to probab-
ility: both impose `temptation' between you and the outcome, and so reduce the
force of positive and negative cues about the outcome. The short-run self who is
`tempted' to spend wins of the lottery immediately is very risk averse with small
prizes relative to the long-run self who, in this model, thinks through the problem
in a risk-neutral way. The authors identify the conditions which activate each self.
Large stakes activate the long-run self who considers the additional amount saved
from accepting the gamble, and small stakes activate the short run self. So this
dual-self model explains diﬀerent attitudes towards risk in the Allais's and the com-
mon ratio paradoxes as some sort of temptation to spend immediately the wins.
Hammond and Zank (2014) oﬀer a comprehensive review of the literature on this
topic, which with the rise of dual self models has recently received more attention
in economics.
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All the dual-self models presented in this section have conﬂicting selves with
conﬂicting preferences. That is, both selves are preference maximisers. When they
agree, the common preference relation is maximised. But the one self can inﬂuence
decisions by constraining, informing, or imposing costs on the ﬁrst. If so, the de-
liberative self resolves the conﬂict by correcting the mistakes of the impulsive self.
The interaction between the two systems is construed in such a way that System 2
is by design the outcome of a process according to standard economic theory.
To sum up, System 2 can be used in dual self models in many ways. I identiﬁed
two of them: the two selves are conﬂicting or cooperative. What these types of
models have in common is that all belong to a class of models in which an existing
economic model can be retrieved. The advantage of the cooperative approach over
the conﬂicting approach is that the optimal decision is calculated on System 2 alone.
System 1 thinking is excluded, and with it the cost of constraining it. On the
conﬂicting approach, the System 2 far-sighted self would have to constrain, often
at some cost, the System 1 short-sighted self to reach a resolution. The underlying
assumption is that the agent possesses some sort of `meta-preferences' or `meta-
rationality' and has the ability to exercise self-control to decide which mode of
thinking should prevail. A corollary of this is that every suboptimal solution is
understood as a failure of self-control.
2.4.3 The complementary systems approach
A third modelling approach is to describe two processes, not their outcome while
staying silent about what these processes are and do. One of the main insights of
dividing psychology into two systems is that we can model the two systems together
or in isolation, and better understand what the reasoning process of System 2 and the
automatic process of System 1 can do. Cognitive sciences have, mostly informally,
described models of this type. These models do not assume or exclude that existing
economic models can be generated by some set of processes. Such a model will have
the potential of telling us whether the brain cannot or simply does not produce
certain reasoning patterns; if rational behaviour can be the output of reasoning or
of automatic processes.
This approach, unlike the ones discussed previously, treats choice as the outcome
of information processing carried out by diﬀerent systems. Systems diﬀer in their
ability to process diﬀerent types of information, and not necessarily in their ration-
ality. This alternative, is closer to Kahneman's original idea of the two systems as
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ways to describe the complementary functions of the brain processes with imperfect
communication. Complementary functions might result in conﬂict or cooperation
deﬁned in the model in some speciﬁc sense. But the main point is that decision
making takes into account the set of systems as a whole to make a choice.
Neurobiology inspired models have naturally adopted this approach. In Brocas
and Carrillo (2012) there is a single decision maker, which they call `Central Exec-
utive System'. Its role is to coordinate the systems that are involved in carrying out
diﬀerent tasks. Each system cares only about transmitting information to perform
its own function which together describe the physiological constraints faced by the
brain in the process of decision-making. Behaviour is the result of the interaction
between systems with diﬀerent objectives. The objective of the coordinator is to
maximise the overall performance in the tasks. Her optimal decision depends on the
physiological constraints of the systems that contribute towards the process carried
out.
Yet another model by Brocas and Carrillo (2011) models the two systems as
diﬀerent ways in which our brain can retrieve information from memory to solve dif-
ferent kinds of (choice) problems. Diﬀerent memory systems solve diﬀerent kinds of
problems. The authors distinguish systems of memory between the declarative and
non-declarative or procedural. Declarative memory refers to recollection of historic
events and facts while non-declarative memory refers to a simple way to retrieve
information. Choice of one system over another is the result of an optimisation
process between the eﬀort and precision required of remembering an experience.
2.4.4 Taking stock
I identiﬁed three main approaches to answering my question. In the ﬁrst two ap-
proaches, choice is the result of two types of selves. In the ﬁrst approach, the two
selves are allies that work together to solve a maximisation problem. In the second
approach, choice is the result of two types of conﬂicting selves, the System 1 `ir-
rational' self and the System 2 `rational' self that solve the maximisation problem
against each other. This way of incorporated the System 1/ System 2 into behavi-
oural economic models has been criticised by Kahneman:
The rational agent of economic theory would be described, in the
language of the present treatment, as endowed with a single cognitive
system that has the logical ability of a ﬂawless System 2 and the low
computing costs of System 1. Theories in behavioral economics have
generally retained the basic architecture of the rational model, adding
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assumptions about cognitive limitations designed to account for speciﬁc
anomalies. (Kahneman, 2003a, p. 1469)
Kahneman's own take on people's often non-economic reasoning is that this does not
show that agents `reason poorly but that they often act intuitively'. The implica-
tions derived in Section 3 make a case for an alternative way of modelling the agent's
reasoning capabilities, according to which System 2 too has its own limitations or
equivalently, that System 1 is not the only source of failures of rationality. At face
value, this might seem wrong. The subconscious, implicit or non-verbal, associative
reasoning processes are the source of some limitations of rationality. And the re-
ﬂective and time-taking System 2 is activated to correct them. Although Kahneman
does not say this explicitly, he seems to suggest it:
When we think of ourselves, we identify with System 2, the conscious,
reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think
about and what to do [...] I describe System 1 as eﬀortlessly originating
impressions and feelings that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs
and deliberate choices of System 2 [...] System 1 has biases, however,
systematic errors that it is prone to make in speciﬁc circumstances.
(Kahneman, 2011, pp. 21 and 25)
But if conscious, explicit or verbal, rule-guided reasoning is part of what is involved
in being rational, the limitations of our conscious, explicit or verbal, rule-guided
reasoning should also be limitations of rationality.6 If both systems have their own
limitations, then both can be the source of systematic errors. Put it in another way,
if a system can be the source of systematic errors, these errors must be errors of
something. They must be errors of failing to reason in some correct way; where this
correct way is the result of an interplay between the two systems. Sugden (2018, p.
68) puts this nicely,
One is not entitled simply to assume that the mental processes of Sys-
tem 2 can generate preferences and modes of strategic reasoning that
are consistent with conventional decision and game theory. Indeed, that
assumption does not ﬁt easily with the logic of dual-process theory. One
of the fundamental insights of that theory is that the automatic pro-
cessing mechanisms of System 1 are evolutionarily older than the con-
scious mechanisms of System 2. Thus, except in so far as its original
features have atrophied, we should expect System 1 to be capable of
6This is something that Kahneman (2011, p. 21) has acknowledged You will be invited to think
of the two systems as agents with their individual abilities, limitations, and functions.
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generating reasonably coherent and successful actions without assistance
from other processes. But if System 2 processes are later add-ons, there
is no obvious reason to expect them to be able to work independently of
the processes to which they have been added.
So if one has not investigated the inner workings of our System 2, one is not en-
titled to assume that System 2 is by design capable of creating those mental states
such as preferences, beliefs, and intentions that a far-sighted self is assumed to have.
For example, Chen (2013) studies future-oriented behaviours such as the stylised
examples of dynamic consistency studied above. This study is an empirical investig-
ation of the time-honoured hypothesis that language aﬀects a decision maker's view
of the world. Chen shows how speaking and thinking in a diﬀerent language af-
fects people's future-oriented behaviours such as saving, exercising, abstaining from
smoking and long-run health. In some languages the future is not separated from
the present. The future appears closer to speakers of these languages, and more
distant to speakers of languages where there is a sharp distinction between present
and future. The speakers of languages where future appears closer tend to save and
adopt a healthy lifestyle more than the speakers of language where future appears
more distant. This, it seems to me, is the outcome of some conscious, explicit,
and verbal process in which we think and make plans. But, as I have discussed
economists have traditionally attributed the behaviour of the short-sighted self as
the outcome of the less rational and impatient System 1, and the behaviour of the
far-sighted self as the outcome of the inﬁnitely patient System 2.
Although Chen's ﬁndings are impressive, his analysis has attracted the criticism
of both economists and linguists. Roberts et al. (2015) have shown that the correl-
ation between languages that grammatically mark future events and their speakers'
propensity to save in Chen's paper is weaker when controlling for links between other
cultural traits. This is despite that in the original paper a set of controls is designed
to address many of these concerns. Another kind of criticism comes from the linguist
Dahl. His criticism is about the way in which Chen classiﬁes languages according
to how strongly they grammatically separate the future and the present (Dahl,
2013). More favourable is the experimental study conducted by Sutter et al. (2015)
in which time preferences of either German-speaking or Italian-speaking primary
school children are examined. Their results provide evidence that is, according to
the authors, `markedly consistent with the linguistic-savings hypothesis proposed by
Chen (2013)'. Becker et al. (2018); Galor et al. (2017); Tabellini (2008) empirically
investigated the eﬀect of language on economic decisions suggesting further evidence
in support of this eﬀect.
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The moral from this section is that on a correct understanding of the dual sys-
tem hypothesis, there is no reason to qualify one self as rational and the other as
irrational. Without an explicit model of the reasoning process by which people are
alleged to construct their rational preferences, we cannot really be sure whether hu-
man behaviour is the output of our reasoned or automatic processes. And, we cannot
really know whether they are mistakes in reasoning or unrealistic assumptions about
reasoning.
2.5 Conclusion
Rational choice often assumes that System 2 is capable of constructing rational and
context-independent preferences according to economic theory. Failure to achieve
them is often attributed to the fast System 1 which often cuts in the decision maker's
System 2 reasoning.
Philosophy and cognitive sciences have highlighted the main features of a cog-
nitive system with the logical ability of System 2. It is conscious, explicit, and
rule-guided. This chapter presented a novel model of the conscious, explicit, and
rule-guided System 2. I have created the formal language that allows us to address
the limitations of System 2. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to formalise
these processes and with it its limitations. Some of these limitations may result from
the fact that System 2 reasoning is conducted in a language. In reasoning explicitly
you cannot start from the absence of an attitude, a thesis that Kolodny agrees with
(2005, pp. 527-8), or conclude in the absence of an attitude, a thesis that Broome
agrees with (2013, p. 278), or conclude in either the presence of one attitude or of
another one.
Theorem 2.2 shows that reasoning that concludes in the absence of an attitude
is impossible, and Theorem 2.3 shows that reasoning that starts from the empty set
although possible is prone to inconsistencies. I also show in theorems 2.5 and 2.4 that
reasoning that concludes in an either ... or ... form is also prone to inconsistencies.
Broome`s own interpretation is that when reasoning fails `automatic processes
will normally prevent you from having contradictory beliefs' to achieve consistency
(2013, pp. 279-280). I discussed certain ways in which System 1 can overcome
the limitations of System 2; Manzini and Mariotti's categorise then choose model
(2012) and Simon's model of satisﬁcing (1955) among others.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Deﬁnitions of closure
I give two equivalent deﬁnitions of C|S: the top-down and the bottom-up clos-
ure. Def. 2.7 and 2.6 give both formal deﬁnitions of C|S. Prop. 2.1 shows their
equivalence.
Deﬁnition 2.6. For any constitution C and any set S of reasoning rules:
1. Deﬁne a constitution C |1 S = C ∪ {m : (M,m) ∈ S and M ⊆ C} that is
produced by maximally applying rules from S to C itself, i.e. 'one-step' ap-
plications of rules.
2. Deﬁne a constitution C |2 S = (C |1 S) |1 S, i.e. by maximally applying rules
from S to C two-times.
3. Deﬁne a constitution C |n S = ((C |1 S) ...) |1 S, i.e. by maximally applying
rules from S to C n-times.
4. Let n be the smallest number at which C |n+1 S = C |n S.
Then deﬁne the bottom-up closure of C under S by C |n S.
Deﬁnition 2.7. For any constitution C and any set S of reasoning rules the revision
C|S is:
(a) The smallest expansion of C that is closed under S, and
(b) The intersection of all expansions of C that are closed under S.
Then deﬁne C|S as the top-down closure of C under S.
I now show their equivalence.
Proposition 2.1. For any constitution C and any set S of reasoning rules, the two
deﬁnitions of bottom-up and top-down closure are logically equivalent.
Proof of Prop. 2.1. Let C be a constitution, S a system 2, and n the smallest num-
ber at which C is closed under S. Consider that C|S is deﬁned in the bottom-up
way. I need to prove the following two: C|S is (a) the smallest expansion of C that
is closed under S, and (b) the intersection of all expansions of C that are closed
under S.
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Proof of (a): (1) By construction, the following are true of C|S: (1a) C|S is an
expansion of C that is closed under S because (C|S) |1S = C|S. (1b) C|S is an
expansion of C that contains every attitude that can be derived from C by successive
application of rules from S.
(2) From (1b), every expansion of C that is closed under S is a weak superset of
C|S.
Proof : Let C ′ be any weak superset of C which is not a weak superset of C|S.
Then there is some attitude m such that m ∈ C|S, m /∈ C ′. By (1b) m can be
derived from C, and hence also from C ′, by successive application of rules from S.
So C ′ is not closed under S.
(3) From (1a) and (2): C|S is the smallest expansion of C that is closed under
S.
Proof of (b): From (2): C|S is a weak subset of the intersection of all expansions
of C that are closed under S. But from (1a), C|S is itself an expansion of C that is
closed under S. So the intersection of all expansions of C that are closed under S
must be C|S.
2.6.2 Proof of the characterisation results
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let T be a theory. Deﬁne the system 2 S as to contain all
reasoning rules corresponding to closedness requirements of T . So S = {(M,m):
the closedeness requirement given by (M,m) is a requirement of T }. Now consider
any initial constitution C0 and any closedness requirement R of T , given by a pair
(M,m).
Claim 1. C0 | S satisﬁes the requirement R.
Proof : This is true because if M ⊆ C0 | S, then m ∈ C0 | S because C0 | S is
closed under S which contains (M,m).
Claim 2. C0 | S preserves consistency.
Proof : Assume C0 is consistent, hence a subset of a rational constitution in C∗
in T . I show that C0 | S ⊆ C∗. This follows from two facts. The ﬁrst is that C∗ is
closed under S, because it is rational and hence, in particular satisﬁes all closedness
requirements of T . The second is that C0 | S is by deﬁnition the smallest expansion
of C0 under S.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Consider a system 2 S, and a consistency requirement R
given by a set of attitudes M . So R = {C : M 66⊆ C}. It suﬃces to specify a
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constitution C0 such that C0 | S violates R. Simply let C0 be any constitution
that includes M . Since C0 | S includes C0, it also includes M , hence violates the
requirement R.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Consider a theory T .
1. For each completeness requirement R of T , ﬁx an arbitraray member mR
of the set M deﬁning R. This is possible because the set M of any completeness
requirement is by deﬁnition non-empty, or so I need to assume. Deﬁne the system
2 as S = {(∅,mR): R is a completeness requirement of T }. Now consider any
constitution C0. I must show that C0 | S satisﬁes all completeness requirements R
of T . As one easily checks, C0 | S=C0∪{mR: R is a completeness requirement of
T }. Clearly, this constitution C0 | S satisﬁes all completeness requirements of T .
2. Let S be a system 2 which achieves a completeness requirement R of T given
by a set M consisting of attitudes whose members are falsiﬁable. I must ﬁnd a
consistent constitution whose revision is inconsistent. I ﬁrst show the following:
Claim. S contains a rule s ={(M ′,m) : m ∈M}.
Proof : Consider any constitution C0 disjoint from M (e.g. C0 = ∅ ). By the
deﬁnition of achieving requirement, S achieves R if ∅ | S satisﬁes R. So there is
a m ∈ M such that m ∈ ∅ | S. This implies the claim, by deﬁnition of revision
through S.
Now let m be as in the above claim. As m is falsiﬁable, we may pick a consistent
constitution C0 such that C0 ∪ {m} is inconsistent. By the deﬁnition of preserving
consistency, every superset of C0∪{m} is inconsistent. I need to show that there is
some consistent constitution C ′ such that C ′|S is inconsistent. The way to do this
is to set C ′ = Cm and to show that Cm|S is inconsistent. So I need to show that
m ∈ Cm|S and hence that, Cm|S is a superset of Cm ∪ {m}. It suﬃces to note that
∅|S ⊆ Cm|S because anything that can be derived from ∅ can be derived from Cm.
Since m ∈ ∅|S, we must have m ∈ Cm|S. So S does not preserve consistency.
Proof of Theorem 2.4 and 2.5. Since Theorem 2.4 is the special case of Theorem 2.5
in which N is a singleton, it suﬃces to prove Theorem 2.5. Consider a theory T .
1. By deﬁnition, each conditional completeness* requirement of T is conditional
on some set M of attitudes, and has at least one attitude from N . For each such
requirement, ﬁx an arbitrary member mN of N , and deﬁne the rule s = (M,mN).
Let S be any System 2 containing one such rule for each conditional completeness*
requirement. Clearly, S achieves all conditional completeness* requirements of T .
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2. Consider any conditional completeness* requirement of T , deﬁned by someM
and N where N 6= ∅. Suppose some consistency-preserving System 2 S achieves this
requirement. Since the requirement is achieved, there must be some m′ ∈ N such
that m′ ∈ M |S. To complete the proof, it suﬃces to show that m′ is not falsiﬁable
given M . To that end, I consider a consistent C0 ⊇M , and must show consistency
of C0∪{m′}. Because S is consistency-preserving, C0|S is consistent. Butm′ ∈M |S
and C0 ⊇ M imply m′ ∈ C0|S. As C0|S (= C0|S ∪ {m′}) is consistent, so is its
subset C0 ∪ {m′}.
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Chapter 3
Preaching rationality
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 presented a simple language-based and rule-following model of reason-
ing and investigated the extent to which rational choice can be reached by it. I
argued that this account of reasoning can be understood as an explicit description
of System 2 reasoning, and showed that if reasoning is conducted in language, it
cannot achieve consistency requirements. In plain English, this result says that, in
reasoning explicitly you cannot conclude in the absence of an attitude, a thesis that
Broome agrees with (2013, p. 278). A legitimate critique against this account of
reasoning is that reasoning that does not allow you to remove an attitude of yours,
even if doing so would prevent you from being inconsistent, is incomplete reason-
ing. 1 Broome's own interpretation is that when explicit reasoning fails `automatic
processes will normally prevent you from having contradictory beliefs' to achieve
consistency (2013, p. 278). But there is not much discussion of this. Chapter 3
gives a possible interpretation.
I re-examine the famous case of Savage's response to the Allais Paradox (1954) in
which Savage explains how he resolved his personal problem of discovering that his
preferences over Allais's gambles were inconsistent with the sure-thing principle; a
basic requirement of rational choice under uncertainty. The interest of reconstructing
Savage's response is that on my Broome-inspired account of reasoning as a rule-
following mental process by which you form new attitudes based on existing ones,
a rule applies only to add a new attitude. For instance, no rule removes the belief
in a proposition p based on the premise belief in not p. So it is unclear how Savage
can reason without the use of such rules that allow the removal of inconsistent
1I would like to thank many people for pointing out to me that this aspect of Broome's account
of reasoning should not remain unaddressed and in particular Ben McQuillin.
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preferences. A possible solution is to start from an ought-belief that you ought
to satisfy the axioms of expected utility to derive the intention to satisfy them.
But on this account of reasoning, this solution is not possible: although you can
conclude through active reasoning that you ought to give up a preference, this adds
an ought-belief rather than removing the preference in question. This ought-belief
may thereafter cause disappearance of this preference, but no longer through explicit
reasoning.
Section 2 gives the background of the debate between Allais and Savage and
Savage's response in his book (1954, pp. 101-103). I conclude that his response
draws on a process of reasoning that goes beyond what I consider as formally `cor-
rect' reasoning and discuss what are the other psychological causal processes that
help Savage to become consistent. In section 3 I use the formal analysis in Chapter
2 to reconstruct Savage's response. Section 4 discusses an alternative response that
starts from the normative belief that a person ought to satisfy the axioms of ex-
pected utility. I argue that this type of reasoning is ineﬀective. Section 5 oﬀers
my concluding remarks of the chapter and Section 6 my concluding remarks of my
thesis.
3.2 Savage's discussion of the Allais paradox
The 1952 Paris symposium on the `Foundations and applications of the theory of
risk-bearing' was the scene of an important debate in the history of behavioural
economics. Savage presented his axiomatization of subjective expected utility that
would later become the core of his book The Foundations of Statistics. Maurice
Allais was among the main objectors to the use of the expected utility axioms as
requirements of rational choice. In an encounter on the fringes of the colloquium
Allais presented Savage with a choice problem that trapped him into violating his
expected utility axioms  what has now become known as the Allais paradox.2
In (1954, pp. 101-103), Savage discusses the paradox and explains how he re-
versed his preferences and become consistent. The problem consists of two decision
situations. Each situation asks for a choice between two gambles. In Situation 1, the
choice is between Gamble 1, which gives $500,000 with probability 1, and Gamble 2,
which gives $2,500,000 with probability 10/100, $500,000 with probability 89/100,
and nothing with probability 1/100. In Situation 2, the choice is between Gamble 3,
which gives $500,000 with probability 11/100 and nothing with probability 89/100,
and Gamble 4, which gives $2,500,000 with probability 10/100 and nothing with
2See in particular, (Mongin, 2018).
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probability 90/100. Savage has initially expressed a preference for Gamble 1 to
Gamble 2 and a preference for Gamble 4 to Gamble 3. This pair of preferences
violated the sure-thing principle which is an implication of his own axioms.3
Savage states, rather informally, the sure-thing principle in (1954, pp. 21-22):
Let me give a relatively formal statement thus: If the person [...] would
deﬁnitely prefer g to f, knowing that E obtained, and, if he would not
prefer f to g, knowing that E did not obtain, then he deﬁnitely prefers g
to f.
In Savage's framework, a preference can be understood as some kind of conditional
intention to choose. Of two gambles, x and y, the preference for x to y is the
attitude that would typically cause x to be chosen from the two gambles given no
other gamble was available. But as he acknowledges (1954, p. 22), the notion of
`f preferred to g, knowing the event E obtains' cannot be expressed in terms of his
primitives. So Savage uses the following example to interpret his principle:
A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He
considers the outcome of the next presidential election relevant. So, to
clarify the matter to himself, he asks whether he would buy if he knew
that the Democratic candidate were going to win, and decides that he
would. Similarly, he considers whether he would buy if he knew that the
Republican candidate were going to win, and again ﬁnds that he would.
Seeing that he would buy in either event, he decides that he should buy,
even though he does not know which event obtains, or will obtain, as we
would ordinarily say. (Savage, 1954, p. 21)
For Savage, the sure-thing principle is, along with P1 (completeness and transitiv-
ity), one of the two `extralogical principle[s] governing decisions'. So Savage develops
`a sense of discomfort' when he ﬁnds out that his initial preferences violate it. In
Savage's own words:
When the two situations were ﬁrst presented, I immediately expressed
[the preferences Allais predicted], and I still feel an intuitive attraction to
those preferences. But I have since accepted the following way of looking
at the two situations which amounts to repeated use of the sure-thing
3There is a large literature in behavioural economics and psychology on choice experiments
showing that people have diﬃculty with hypothetical thinking, and particularly the type of hypo-
thetical reasoning that is related to the sure-thing principle (see in particular, (Slovic and Tversky,
1974; Esponda and Vespa, 2014, 2017; Sugden, 1991; Berg and Gigerenzer, 2010; Allais, 1953;
Shaﬁr and Tversky, 1992; Cubitt and Sugden, 2003, 2014; Cubitt et al., 1998)).
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Situation 1
Gamble 1
`certain'
`large prize'
Gamble 2
`unlikely' `likely' `very unlikely'
`very large prize' `large prize' `no prize'
Situation 2
Gamble 3
`unlikely' `likely'
`large prize' `no prize'
Gamble 4
`unlikely' `likely'
`very large prize' `no prize'
Table 3.1: Savage's initial mental representation of the two decision situations.
principle [. . . ] It seems to me that in reversing my preference between
Gambles 3 and 4 I have corrected an error (Savage, 1954, p. 103)
The passage in which Savage spells out his own way of looking at the two situations
which amounts to repeated use of the sure-thing principle is two pages long (1954,
pp. 101-103), which is relatively short given that Savage's response to Allais depends
on it. It will be useful to divide his response into smaller parts or steps and when
possible, represent his `reasoning' in them.
In Step 1 Savage expresses his initial preferences for Gamble 1 to Gamble 2
in Situation 1 and for Gamble 4 to Gamble 3 in Situation 2. He says that these
preferences report his `initial impression of the situation' as one between the gift of
a large prize and the chance of winning a very large prize in Situation 1, and one
between a large prize and a very large prize at nearly the same chance in Situation
2 (1954, p. 102). In this spirit, Rubinstein (1988) has proposed a model in which
people check similarities between outcomes and between probabilities in gambles.
If only one of the two dimensions, probabilities or outcomes, are similar, then the
other dimension becomes the decisive factor. Table 1 is one possible way to present
Savage's initial mental representation of the two situations. From this table it can
be seen that, you compare the certainty of a large prize in Gamble 1 with the chance
to win a very large prize in Gamble 2, and the chance to win a very large prize in
Gamble 4 with the chance to win a large prize in Gamble 3; which justiﬁes why you
may end up expressing `a strong intuitive appeal' for Gamble 1 to Gamble 2 and for
Gamble 4 to Gamble 3.
The language in which you compare the gambles (in terms of their sizes and the
chances of winning them) is vague and coarse but intuitive, allowing you to immedi-
ately express your inclinations. But in the explicit language of expected utilities in
which you multiply exact probabilities and utilities, the inequalities U($500,000) >
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100 Tickets 1 2 to 11 12 to 100
Situation 1
Gamble 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
Gamble 2 0 2.5 0.5
Situation 2
Gamble 3 0.5 0.5 0
Gamble 4 0 2.5 0
Table 3.2: Savage's mental representation of the two decision situations in Step 2
(prizes are in units of $1,000,000).
10/100 U($2,500,000) + 89/100 U($500,000) + 1/100 U(0), and 11/100 U($500,000)
+ 89/100 U(0) < 10/100 U($2,500,000) + 90/100 U(0) are inconsistent as no func-
tion U satisﬁes both inequalities. Savage realises that his preferences are inconsist-
ent with expected utility, and indeed with the sure-thing principle, so, in Step 2
he presents his reader with a table in which the two situations can be reconstructed
with the sure-thing principle. In it, uncertainty is not described by probabilities but
by a set of states of the world which in this case represent a lottery with a hundred
tickets numbered 1100. The set of all states of the world are all possible tickets in
the lottery. Table 2 adopts Savage's representation of the two situations.
Notice that, Savage's reconstruction of the two situations does not make any
direct reference to his own theoretical framework. A person that does not know ex-
pected utility theory might be able to think of the four gambles in the two situations
in an explicit way in terms of a lottery or another notion that represents probabilit-
ies. One possibility is to sketch a table in which there are four rows corresponding to
the Gambles 1, 2, 3, 4 and a hundred columns each corresponding to the probability
1/100; and then assign the outcome of a given gamble in the corresponding row
and column(s). One way of doing this, say for Gamble 2, is to assign 0 in column
one, $2,500,000 in columns 2 to 11, and $500,000 in all other columns. If we ﬁrst
group the columns with the same outcome for any given gamble and then align the
outcomes in each column, we will obtain Table 3 which is the same as Table 2 with
only exception that the 100 tickets of Savage's lottery have been replaced by 100
columns.
From the previous step, Savage infers in Step 3 that the two choices between
the `original' pairs of gambles in the situations depends on the choice between a
`new' pair of gambles given that one of the tickets numbered from 1 to 11 is drawn.
In Savage's words (1954, p. 103):
if one of the tickets numbered from 12 through 100 is drawn, it will not
matter, in either situation, which gamble I choose. I therefore focus on
the possibility that one of the tickets numbered from 1 through 11 will
be drawn, in which case Situations 1 and 2 are exactly parallel
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Columns 1 2 ... 11 12 ... 100
Situation 1
Gamble 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
Gamble 2 0 2.5 0.5
Situation 2
Gamble 3 0.5 0.5 0
Gamble 4 0 2.5 0
Table 3.3: Explicit representation of the decision situations (prizes are in units of
$1,000,000).
100 Tickets 1 2 to 11 2 to 11
Events E E¯
Situation 1
Gamble 1 0.5 0.5 *
Gamble 2 0 2.5 *
Situation 2
Gamble 3 0.5 0.5 #
Gamble 4 0 2.5 #
Table 3.4: Savage's mental representation of the two decision situations in Step 3
(prizes are in units of $1,000,000).
In Table 4, I present a possible way of representing Savage's reasoning in this
step in which he focuses on the possibility that one of the tickets numbered from 1
through 11 will be drawn. For representational convenience, I write E and E¯ (the
complement of E) to demarcate the possibility that a ticket numbered from 1 to 11
is drawn from the lottery, from the possibility that a ticket numbered from 12 to
100 is drawn from the lottery. In each situation, the outcomes of the two gambles
are the same in E¯ but diﬀer in E. So Savage focuses on event E and ignores the
event E¯ where in each situation outcomes are the same. I label with `*' the same
outcomes in E¯ in Situation 1 and with `#' the same outcomes in E¯ in Situation 2.
Note that in Savage's framework, the notion of an event is deﬁned as a collection of
states of the world, but his analysis does not make any explicit use of this notion.
The upshot is that Savage can now alter his initial preferences by forming a
preference between the gambles conditional on a ticket numbered from 1 to 11 being
drawn from the lottery rather than between the acts themselves. So the next step,
Step 4, is to reconsider his preferences focusing on event E:
The subsidiary decision depends in both situations on whether I would
sell an outright gift of $500,000 for a 10-to-1 chance to win $2,500,000
 a conclusion that I think has a claim to universality, or objectivity.
(Savage, 1954, p. 103)
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Events E E¯
Situation 3
Gamble 1 or 3
`certain'
*
`large prize'
Gamble 2 or 4
`unlikely' `very likely'
*
`no prize' `very large prize'
Table 3.5: Savage's mental representation of the decision situations after repeated
use of the sure-thing principle.
So in Step 4 Savage calls back his intuitive and non-explicit language he used
in Step 1 to justify his preference for Gamble 1 to Gamble 2 in E (equivalently for
Gamble 3 to Gamble 4 in E), thus expressing a preference for a large and certain
prize to a very large but uncertain prize. Table 5 illustrates the natural way in which
Savage justiﬁes his preferences between the new pair of gambles in E, call this a new
situation `Situation 3'. On this `way of looking at' the decision problem, the decision
in Situation 1 between the certainty of a large prize (Gamble 1) and a very large but
uncertain prize (Gamble 2) and the decision in Situation 2 between an uncertain
but very large prize (Gamble 4) and an uncertain but large prize (Gamble 3), have
been reconstructed into a decision between a new pair of gambles: the certainty of
a large prize (Gamble 1 or 3 in E) and a very large but uncertain prize (Gamble 2
or 4 in E). What is crucial, the uncertain Gamble 2 has been transformed into a
less uncertain Gamble 2 in E and the uncertain Gamble 3 has transformed into a
certain Gamble 3 in E. In Savage's words, ... consulting my purely personal taste,
I ﬁnd that I would prefer the gift of $500,000 ...  (Savage, 1954, p. 103).
In Step 5 Savage moves back from Situation 3 to situations 1 and 2. He uses
the sure-thing principle in two instances: once to express a preference for Gamble 1
to Gamble 2 in Situation 1 given his preference for Gamble 1 or 3 in E to Gamble
2 or 4 in E in Situation 3, and a second time to express a preference for Gamble 3
to Gamble 4 in Situation 2 given his preference for Gamble 1 or 3 in E to Gamble 2
or 4 in E in Situation 3. Now Savage, has two conﬂicting preferences: a preference
for Gamble 3 to Gamble 4 and a preference for Gamble 4 to Gamble 3.
Savage says that, ... accordingly, [I ﬁnd] that I prefer Gamble 1 to Gamble 2
and (contrary to my initial reaction) Gamble 3 to Gamble 4. (Savage, 1954, p.
103). The ﬁnal step in Svage's response to the problem, Step 6, is to ﬁnd that he
no longer has a preference for Gamble 4 to Gamble 3.
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Discussing an analogous case, Savage says:
When it is explicitly brought to my attention [that my preferences are
non-transitive] I feel uncomfortable in much the same way as when it is
brought to my attention that some of my beliefs are logically contradict-
ory. Whenever I examine such a triple of preferences on my own part, I
ﬁnd that it is not at all diﬃcult to reverse one of them. In fact, I ﬁnd on
contemplating the three alleged preferences side by side that at least one
of them is not a preference at all, at any rate not any more. (Savage,
1954, p. 21)
It seems that Savage's reasoning does not involve an intention to remove the pref-
erence for Gamble 4 to Gamble 3 to become consistent. But Savage's reasoning
to become consistent draws on some sort of `implicit' or `automatic' process that
replaces his old preference with his new preference for Gamble 3 to Gamble 4 that
is derived by reasoning from premises he feels conﬁdent about.
The moral from this section is twofold: First, Savage develops `a sense of discom-
fort' when he ﬁnds out that his initial preferences violate the sure-thing principle,
and subsequently, adopts a `way of looking at' the decision problem [represented
in Tables 2-5] that helps him reach a new set of preferences, about which he feels
more conﬁdent. Second, Savage's newly-reached preferences satisfy the sure-thing
principle, and Savage reaches these preferences drawing on a process that combines
System 1 with System 2. In particular, Savage draws on System 1 not only to ex-
press his initial preferences in Step 1 [represented in Table 1] but also to express
a preference between the new pair of gambles in E in Step 4 [represented in Table
5]. Notice that Table 5 is a natural representation of the decision in Situation 3
which justiﬁes why you may end up producing Savage's revised preferences (Gamble
3 preferred to Gamble 4) while Table 1 is a natural representation of the decisions in
situations 1 and 2 which justiﬁes why you may end up producing Allais's preferences
(Gamble 4 preferred to Gamble 3).
The section above re-examined a particular case: Savage's own account of how
he `corrected' his `error' of having preferences that violate the axioms of expected
utility theory. Many decision theorists and behavioural economists also characterise
behaviour that violates these axioms as `error' and assume that individuals will
somehow be able to correct this error. One particular way is to think that preaching
the axioms of expected utility theory as normative will (eventually) help people
make more rational choices and less biased judgments. I call this, the preaching
approach. The alternative is to think that people can construct rational preferences
without knowing, for example without being preached, what the axioms of expected
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utility are. If you have a `legitimate' way of discovering that your preferences are in
some sense in `error' with you, because if you apply a legitimate rules of reasoning on
these preferences you end up in a contradiction, then you can revise these preferences.
I call this the rule-following approach. The next two sub-sections are about these
two approaches and how Savage's response is related to them.
3.3 The preaching approach
Advocates of the preaching approach include Gilboa (2010, p. 4), Gilboa (2009,
pp. 200-201), and Bleichrodt et al. (2001), among others. Gilboa discusses two
approaches in face of experimental evidence showing that in practice people often
violate the axioms of rational choice:4
One approach is to incorporate them [the violations] into our descriptive
theories, to make the latter more accurate. This is, to a large extent,
the road taken by behavioral economics. Another approach is to go out
and preach our classical theories, that is, to use them as normative ones.
For example, if we teach more probability calculus in highschool, future
generations might make less mistakes in probability judgments. [...] [I]f
we ﬁnd that, when we explain the theory to decision makers, they are
convinced and wish to change their choices, (that is, if their choices were
irrational to them), we may declare a success of the classical theory as
a normative one. It would indeed be reasonable to preach the classical
theory and help decision makers make better decisions (as judged by
themselves) (Gilboa, 2010, p. 4)
Against the preaching approach, there are two main lines of criticism. Those,
Broome (2013), Infante et al. (2016), and Sugden (2018) among them, who think
that preaching is not eﬀective and do not assume that failing to respond to preaching
is a reasoning error; but argue that we need to understand the reasoning process by
which people are supposed to satisfy the rationality requirements. And those, Thaler
and Sunstein (2008) among them as proponents of the nudging approach, who think
that preaching is not eﬀective but assume that failing to respond to preaching is a
reasoning error. This chapter is about the former. Chapter 2 has commented on the
latter. Broome criticises theorists that seek to describe theories of rationality such
as rational choice theory in terms of requirements of rationality (e.g. the sure-thing
4Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995); Gilboa et al. (2009, 2012, p. 630) acknowledge that forming
preferences according to expected utility is not always rational or even possible. They do not
necessarily accept expected utility as normative criterion.
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principle), and often neglect to explain the `reasoning' by which one comes to satisfy
these requirements. In the words of Broome:
[they] seem to think they have ﬁnished their job when they have de-
scribed the requirements of rationality. [. . . ] I think these authors must
believe that, once you know what requirements there are, that knowledge
directly supplies you with premises you can use in active reasoning. They
must believe that, starting from knowledge of a particular requirement,
you can reason your way actively to satisfying that requirement (2013,
pp. 208-9)
According to Broome, second-order reasoning  reasoning about propositions about
your own attitudes  cannot actively bring you to satisfy a particular requirement.
For instance, you can conclude through active reasoning that you ought to give up
your belief in p, but this adds an ought-belief rather than removing the belief in
p. This ought-belief may thereafter cause disappearance of the belief in p, but no
longer through explicit reasoning. Broome thus concludes that having second-order
attitudes is not necessary for reasoning (2013, p. 236). Rather, for him, reasoning
is mainly with and not about your attitudes because this is the fundamental kind of
reasoning that is done using language (2013, pp. 268-86).
Infante et al. (2016) and Sugden (2018) have criticised the preaching approach as
psychologically problematic. According to Sugden, behavioural welfare economics
explains the inability to construct rational (complete and transitive) and context-
independent preferences as reasoning imperfections but,
does not try to explain the reasoning by which individuals construct
their preferences. Implicitly, rational-choice theory assumes the exist-
ence of a mode of reasoning that generates preferences that satisfy the
consistency axioms, but it treats that reasoning as a black box (2018,
p. 63).
For Infante et al. and Sugden, these economists assume the existence of an `inner
rational agent' who is isolated from the world by `a psychological shell', and who can
construct rational (complete and transitive) and context-independent preferences.
Their reply is that the `preachers' ought to tell us what they think this process that
leads to rational and context-independent preferences is.
Slovic and Tversky (1974) point out another problem of thinking that preaching
the theory's axioms as normative (even if they are rationality axioms) will make
people more rational. Their study looks experimentally at whether preaching the
sure-thing principle is enough to convince people to accept it. This study can be
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classiﬁed as an empirical test for the preaching approach. In a ﬁrst experiment,
subjects were asked to report their preferences between two pairs of gambles in
two decision problems; the Allais and the Ellsberg decision problems which are two
classical examples that show that people's choices violate the sure-thing principle.
Having reported their preferences, subjects were asked to read the competing ar-
guments of experts Dr. S, advocating Savage's sure-thing principle, and Dr. A.,
advocating Allais' position. Those who made a choice in accordance with the prin-
ciple were asked to read Dr. A's position and those who made a choice violating the
axiom were asked to read Dr. S's position. Exposed to arguments that countered
their choices, subjects were asked whether they would switch them. The authors
found that subjects' choices survived the counterarguments with that of Dr. S be-
ing even less eﬀective in inﬂuencing the subjects' choices. In a second experiment,
subjects were given both arguments for and against the sure-thing principle and
were asked to rate how persuasive these arguments were. The authors found that
subjects rated Dr A's arguments as more persuasive. Slovic and Tversky conclude
their paper with a hypothetical dialogue between Dr. S and Dr. A. The authors
attribute preaching to Dr. S and the psychological mechanism that experimental
economists have used to explain observed violations to Dr. A. Dr. S, who tries to
defend his axiom against Dr. A's critique, says:
In my experience, it often takes a long time for people to appreciate the
normative impact of axioms. They have to be educated before they are
willing to live by the axioms of rational choice.
And Dr. A's hypothetical answer is,
You seem to be saying that [the sure-thing principle] enjoys normative
status because [...] some people could convince other people that they
should accept it. Even if I could accept the axiom, I certainly could not
accept this criterion. Your ability to convince people to accept an axiom
is not a suﬃcient basis for establishing its normative appeal. What you
call education, others may call brainwashing. Why do you not simply
accept the fact that, unlike transitivity, [the sure-thing principle] lacks
general appeal as a normative principle of choice? (Slovic and Tversky,
1974, p. 372)
The authors' conclusion section aims to stress that success in preaching an axiom is
not evidence of the rationality of the axiom. Since Dr. S's and Dr. A's arguments
are contradictory but both had persuasive power as a matter of empirical fact, it
would be a mistake to assume that preaching rationality is eﬀective.
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So Slovic and Tversky attribute the preaching approach to Savage who believed
his axioms to be normative and famously said: the main use I would make of
[completeness and transitivity] and its successors is normative, to police my own
decisions for consistency and, where possible, to make complicated decisions depend
on simpler ones (1954, p. 20). Unfortunately, Savage never explains in his response
to Allais in (1954, pp. 101-103) how he became aware of his violation. Savage
might have learned, by hunch, private information or reasoning, that the sure-thing
principle is violated. Most plausibly, Savage has been told that his initial preferences
violate the sure-thing principle which explains his initial `sense of discomfort'. One
way to interpret `to police [his] own decisions for consistency' is that he relies on
some sort of second-order reasoning as he knows that his preferences violate the
sure-thing principle. Then Savage plausibly forms the belief that `I ought to satisfy
the the sure-thing principle' and then creates an intention to satisfy it.
Let us investigate this approach considering Savage's response from the previous
section. I illustrated that Savage can police his decisions without using any type
of second-order normative beliefs. Having second-order beliefs that you ought to
be consistent is not suﬃcient for you to become consistent. Savage knows that his
initial preferences are inconsistent but does not know which of the two preference
to throw out. Expected utility does not tell you which of the initial preferences to
throw out. It can help you work out that if you prefer Gamble 1 to Gamble 2 then
you prefer Gamble 3 to Gamble 4, but cannot help you work out which preference to
throw out, the preference for Gamble 1 over Gamble 2 or the preference for Gamble
4 over Gamble 3 on the basis of your belief that they are inconsistent. Moreover,
although Savage has most probably been told that his initial preferences violate the
sure-thing principle, this might not always be the case: we can plausibly violate the
axioms of expected utility without being aware that we do so. The belief that we
ought to satisfy them is of no help if we do not have a legitimate way of discovering
the error to which, we are are supposed to be subjected to. The implication is
that having the second-order belief that you ought be consistent is not a suﬃcient
condition to become consistent.
Neither is it necessary. Savage believed that his initial preferences cannot be
held together after ﬁnding that they violate the sure-thing principle and has possibly
formed the belief that `My preference for Gamble 1 to Gamble 2 and my preference
for Gamble 4 to Gamble 3 are inconsistent', but then he found a legitimate way
of looking at the two situations, which resulted in a new set of preferences. Savage
derives this new set of preferences from premises that he feels more conﬁdent about 
the preference knowing that E obtains  and so reverses one of his initial preferences
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that Allais predicted. So my reading of `make complicated decisions depend on
simpler ones' is that Savage made the complicated decisions between Gamble 1 and
Gamble 2 in Situation 1 and between Gamble 3 and Gamble 4 in Situation 2 depend
on the simpler one between two new gambles knowing that E obtains in Situation
3 and did not have to rely on any type of second-order beliefs.
3.4 The rule-following approach
The legitimate way in which Savage reaches his new preferences justiﬁes why Savage
feels more conﬁdent about them and willing to revise with them his initial prefer-
ences. This way of interpreting Savage's response reminds of Gilbert's argument in
his seminar article "How mental systems believe." in which he argues that the main
role of conscious reasoning is to help us doubt or unbelieve what we initially think
or judge to be true (Gilbert, 1991). Kahneman who wants to relate Gilbert's work
to his own analysis in terms of the intuitive System 1 and the rule-following System
2 notes:
The initial attempt to believe is an automatic operation of System 1,
which involves the construction of the best possible interpretation of the
situation. Even a nonsensical statement, Gilbert argues, will evoke initial
belief [...] The moral is signiﬁcant: when System 2 is otherwise engaged,
we will believe almost anything. System 1 is gullible and biased to
believe, System 2 is in charge of doubting and unbelieving (Kahneman,
2011, p. 81)
But Savage was aware that his preferences violated the sure-thing principle. The
interest of this case is to check whether Savage did or could reason his way out
of paradox without relying on any form of second-order reasoning that is, if he
could discover that the preferences for Gamble 1 and for Gamble 4 are inconsistent
without knowing that the sure-thing principle is violated. To do so, I use the formal
analysis in Chapter 2 to develop an account of reasoning in which Savage can: (i)
discover that his initial preferences are, in some sense in `error', because if he applies
a legitimate rules of reasoning on these preferences he ends up in a contradiction; (ii)
derive a new preference between Gambles 3 and 4 by reasoning from a pre-existing
preference `knowing event E obtains'; and (iii) use these preferences to reason his
way out of the paradox.
To do so, I adopt Savage's primitive into my model and reconstruct his response.
Let Z be a non-empty set of consequences and W a non-empty set of exhaustive
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states of the world. We assume Z and W are ﬁnite for simplicity. In this case, the
gambles' outcomes form the set of consequences and the tickets numbered 1100 in
the lottery describe the set of all states of the world. An act f : W → Z maps states
into consequences. So f(w) is the consequence of choosing act f if the state of the
world is w. An act is constant if the consequence of choosing act f is the same in
all states of the world, i.e. f(w) = z for all w ∈ W . I identify constant acts with
elements of X in Chapter 2. Let F denote the set of all acts. The decision maker has
intentions and preferences (strict preferences and indiﬀerences) over acts, and forms
beliefs that certain acts from F are feasible. Let Y ⊆ F be the non-empty subset
of choice acts that are feasible. Sets L = F ∪ 2F \ {∅} and A = {,∼, bel, int}
are all I need to represent Savage's framework. I enrich this framework allowing
the decision maker to form comparative beliefs over events and form `a preference
knowing event E obtains' which are derived notions in Savage's framework. I take
them as primitive attitudes to formalise the sure-thing principle which in Savage's
original framework is an informal principle. Let E ⊆ W denote a set of states. I
denote the complement of a set E by E¯. The belief that one event is more probable
than (or as probable as) the other is denoted > (=). The preference (indiﬀerence)
between a pair of acts knowing that some event E obtains is denoted E (∼E). Let
a constitution C be a set of attitudes at any given point in time. I can now state
formally the sure thing principle.56
 For any f, g ∈ F and E ⊆ W , if [(f, g,E) ∈ C or (f, g,∼E) ∈ C] and
[(f, g,E¯) ∈ C or (f, g,∼E¯) ∈ C] then [(f, g,) ∈ C or (f, g,∼) ∈ C]
Moreover,
 For any f, g ∈ F and E ⊆ W , if [(f, g,E) ∈ C] and [(f, g,E¯) ∈ C or
(f, g,∼E¯) ∈ C] then (f, g,) ∈ C
The sure-thing principle recommends to ignore the events where outcomes are the
same. Outcomes are the same where acts agree. Following Savage, f agrees with g
in event E if f(w) = g(w) for every w ∈ W . I write this proposition f = g in E. Let
V = F ×F × 2W denote the collection of all such propositions. The agent can form
5The sure-thing principle, has meaning provided that E is non-null. Given null event, acts play
no role for the ﬁnal decision. According to Savage, event E is null iﬀ you are indiﬀerent between
act f and g conditional on E for every f, g. In our framework, we allow (E might occur, bel) to
be analogous with `E is non-null'.
6The following four subschemas imply the sure-thing principle:
1. if (f, g,E) ∈ C and (f, g,E¯) ∈ C then (f, g,) ∈ C.
2. if (f, g,E) ∈ C and (f, g,∼E¯) ∈ C then (f, g,) ∈ C
3. if (f, g,∼E) ∈ C and (f, g,E¯) ∈ C then (f, g,) ∈ C
4. if (f, g,∼E) ∈ C and (f, g,∼E¯) ∈ C then (f, g,∼) ∈ C
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beliefs towards elements from V . Savage has informally argued that Separability
P2 and P3, his second and third axioms, support the sure-thing principle. Savage's
initial preferences for Gamble 1 in Situation 1 and for Gamble 4 in Situation 2 violate
P2. I can now state separability:
 Separability P2. For any f, g, f ′, g′ ∈ F , E ⊆ W , if:
1. (f = f ′ in E, bel) ∈ C and (g = g′ in E, bel) ∈ C
2. (f = g in E¯, bel) ∈ C and (f ′ = g′ in E¯, bel) ∈ C
3. (f, g,) ∈ C
Then (f ′, g′,) ∈ C.
Having mapped the main ingredients of Savage's framework into the model, I can
now reconstruct Savage's response. To do so, I need to deﬁne the concept of a rule,
or of a revision following a rule. A rule applies to add a new attitude, the conclu-
sion. Formally, a rule is a pair s = (M,m) of a set of premise attitudes M and a
conclusion attitude m. So the revision C|s of a person's constitution C is achieved
through a rule s by adding the conclusion provided all premise attitudes are present.
For simplicity, the labels f , g, f ′, and g′ will be used for the gambles 1, 2, 3, and 4
respectively. The labels E and E¯ will be used for the two events. In Step 1 Savage
expresses his initial preferences. According to Separability, a preference for Gamble
1 in Situation 1 implies a preference for Gamble 3 in Situation 2, and similarly, a
preference for Gamble 4 in Situation 2 implies a preference for Gamble 2 in Situation
1. Savage's initial preferences for Gamble 1 in Situation 1 and for Gamble 4 in Situ-
ation 2 violate the conjunction of Separability and Asymmetry of Preference. Based
on the typology of requirements presented in Chapter 1, Separability is a closedness
requirement. Theorem 1 of Chapter 2 shows that there is some rule of reasoning
which achieves Separability. Given that there exists some rule of reasoning which
achieves Separability, if Savage uses this rule (or set of rules) of reasoning, given
his initial preferences, he will arrive at a constitution which violates a consistency
condition (Gamble 1 will be both preferred and less preferred to Gamble 2, and
similarly for Gambles 3 and 4).
Savage starts his reasoning in Step 1 expressing his initial preferences for f over
g and for g′ over f ′. These preferences are not the result of explicit reasoning but
of intuition. They enter in our model as inputs to System 2 reasoning. Formally,
they form the initial constitution C0 = {(f, g,), (g′, f ′,), ...} before any rule
from set of System 2 rules S has been applied, where `...' stands for all other
mental states that might be in the constitution. Then Savage notices that the
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two acts f and g agree in event E¯. So, the belief attitude (f = g in E¯, bel) is
now in the constitution C1 = {(f, g,), (g′, f ′,), (f = g in E¯, bel), ...}. A natural
rule for deriving the new preference knowing that event E obtains (f, g,E) from
the original preference (f, g,) is s = ({(f, g,), (f = g in E¯, bel)}, (f, g,E)).
Thus Savage can apply rule s to C1, expanding the constitution to C2 = C1|s =
{(f, g,), (g′, f ′,), (f = g in E¯, bel), (f, g,E), ...}. Then he notices that f and
f ′, and g and g′ agree in E. So C2 expands to include (f = f ′ in E, bel) and
(g = g′ in E, bel), giving C3 ={(f, g,), (g′, f ′,), (f = g in E¯, bel),(f, g,E),
(f = f ′ in E, bel), (g = g′ in E, bel), ...}. Savage then can apply another rule s′ =
({(f, g,E), (f = f ′ in E, bel), (g = g′ in E, bel)}, (f ′, g′,E)) to C3 which derives
a new preference knowing that event E obtains from the old one. So, C4 = C3|s′.
Then after noticing that f ′ and g′ agree in E¯, constitution C4 is expanded with
(f ′ = g′ in E¯, bel). Savage can now derive a new preference from the old preference
knowing that event E obtains applying rule s′′ = ({(f ′ = g′ in E¯, bel), (f ′, g′,E
)}, (f ′, g′,)) to the expanded C5, C6 = C5|s′′. So by applying this set of rules to
the initial C0 we obtain the constitution C6 = {(f, g,), (g′, f ′,), ..., (f ′, g′,)}.
Preferences (f ′, g′,) and (g′, f ′,) violate asymmetry of . Savage can apply
a diﬀerent set of Separability rules S ′ to the initial constitution C0. Savage can
ﬁrst derive the preference (g′, f ′,E) from the preference (g′, f ′,) after noticing
that f ′ and g′ agree in event E¯; then derive a new preference (g, f,E) from the old
preference (g′, f ′,E) after noticing that f and f ′ and g and g′ agree in E; and ﬁnally
derive the new preference (g, f,) from the old preference (g, f,E) after noticing
that f ′ and g′ agree in E¯. So applying the set of rule S ′ to C0 Savage obtains the
constitution C ′ = {(f, g,), (g′, f ′,), ..., (g, f,)}. Now preferences (f, g,) and
(g, f,) violate asymmetry of . The point is that for any set of Separability rules
S, the closure of the initial constitution C0|S will violate asymmetry of .
The next thing to do is to infer that the initial constitution C0 is inconsistent
because if you expand it by legitimate rules of reasoning you end up in a contra-
diction. So Savage concludes in the belief that C0 is inconsistent. The reasoning
described above is ﬁrst-order, and concludes with a constitution that is inconsistent.
Savage now needs to use second order reasoning, possibly, with a rule like: {(f, g,),
(g, f,)}, (my constitution is inconsistent, bel). If Savage's recognition of his incon-
sistency is a second-order attitude, arriving at it has to involve second-order reas-
oning. Alternatively, if Savage's recognition of his inconsistency is an unconscious
attitude, arriving at it can but does not have to involve second-order reasoning. In
any case, having both (f, g,) and (g, f,) creates a sense of dicomfort to Savage.
The problem is with his reasoning before applying any rules from S. It is the System
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1 reasoning that led to the initial constitution C0 = {(f, g,), (g′, f ′,), ...}. C0 vi-
olates a consistency requirement which is derived by Separabality and asymmetry
of : that if (f, g,) ∈ C and `...' then (g′, f ′,) /∈ C where `...' stands for the
mental states in part 1 and part 2 of the Separability requirement.7
If Savage is to remove the inconsistency, he must remove one of the initial pref-
erences. Does reasoning which starts from the belief that C0 is inconsistent and
the belief that one ought to be consistent helps Savage to remove one of these
preferences? Savage knows from expected utility that his initial preferences are in-
consistent but does not know which preference to throw out, and as he self-reports:
`[he] still feel[s] an intuitive attraction to those preferences'.
Then in Step 4 Savage adopts a way to look again at the two decision situations
focusing on event E. He calls back System 1 to express the preference (f, g,E) and
thus the preference (f ′, g′,E). Savage notices that f and g, and f ′ and g′ agree in
E¯, and that in either situation it will not matter which gamble is chosen. So Savage
is indiﬀerent between f and g in E¯ and f ′ and g′ in E¯. The indiﬀerences (f, g,∼E¯)
and (f ′, g′,∼E¯) are now in his constitution.
The implication is that in Step 5 Savage uses a rule to derive a new preference
 from E. Savage can apply rule r′ = ({(f, g,E), (f, g,∼E¯)}, (f, g,)) which de-
rives the preference (f, g,) from the preference (f, g,E) and rule r′′ = ({(f ′, g′,E
), (f ′, g′,∼E¯)}, (f ′, g′,E)) which derives the preference (f ′, g′,) from the prefer-
ence (f ′, g′,E) . The last the step is the step at which Savage removes (g′, f ′,)
from his constitution and replaced it it by (f ′, g′,). I explain in Section 2 that
Savage replaces his old preference with his new preference for Gamble 3 to Gamble
4 that is derived by reasoning from premises he feels conﬁdent about drawing on
some sort of `implicit' or `automatic' process.
To sum up, as the above analysis illustrates, Savage applies a set of legitimate
rules to his constitution that contained his initial preferences, and ends up with an
inconsistent pair of preferences. He then concludes that the initial constitution is
inconsistent because if you expand it by legitimate rules of reasoning you end up
in a contradiction. But in Savage's response to his problem of inconsistency both
System 2 and System 1 participate. Savage concludes that the initial constitution is
inconsistent because by expanding it by legitimate rules of reasoning he end up in
a contradiction, but he does not know which of the two preferences to revise as he
still feels they are intuitively appealing. So he brings back System 1 to reconsider
his preferences knowing that E obtains. I conclude that Savage's response draws
7Indeed, given the sure-thing principle, asymmetry of , symmetry of ∼, and exclusiveness of
 and ∼, these preferences also violate another consistency requirement. This is for any f, g ∈ F
and E ⊆W , if (f, g,E) ∈ C and (f, g,∼E¯) ∈ C then (g, f,) /∈ C.
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necessarily on a process of reasoning that goes beyond what I describe as formally
correct System 2 reasoning in Chapter 2.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter re-examined the famous case of Savage's response to the Allais paradox
in (1954, pp. 101-103), in which Savage discusses how his initial preferences violated
the sure-thing principle and explains how he reversed his preferences and became
consistent. I discussed Savage's response in this text and tried, when possible, to
reconstruct it with my Broomean model of reasoning. The upshot is that Savage's
response draws on a mental process that combines ﬁrst-order reasoning (System
2) and automatic processes or intuitive thinking (System 1). I then explored an
alternative response according to which knowing what rationality axioms there are
can help you become more rational, e.g. by creating the intention to remove the
preferences that violate these axioms. I argued that this interpretation would not
be justiﬁed by Savage's own discussion of how he resolved his problem.
3.6 Conclusion of the thesis
I have started this thesis with a question: can rational choice be reached by System
2? and the subquestion how do we, as economists, model it? I investigated
three possible approaches to answering this question that all, in one way or another,
incorporate some sort of dual-process model of reasoning for choice. First, there
are choice theorists who have implicitly given an aﬃrmative answer by considering
expected utility axioms as normative without giving a psychological explanation of
how they come to be satisﬁed. Then there are the dual self models. Choice is the
result of the interaction of two types of selves, the System 1 `irrational' self and the
System 2 `rational' self that solve a maximisation problem. Their answer is also
aﬃrmative identifying System 2 reasoning with economic reasoning.
The novelty of the dual-systems hypothesis, however, is that it explicitly models
two possible complementary ways-of-thinking, not two possible ways of producing
conﬂicting preference schemas. This approach is more faithful to Kahneman's view
of the two systems. I presented a new model that is inspired by Broome's own
answer to this questions. With it, I have shown that System 2 understood as a
conscious, explicit, and rule-guided mental process can achieve many but not all
types of rational choice requirements, and particularly cannot achieve consistency
requirements. To illustrate my point further, I applied the model to show how
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Savage resolved his personal problem of discovering that his preferences over Allais's
gambles are inconsistent with the sure-thing principle.
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